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THE HUMAN SELF IN JOSIAH ROYCE'S
THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL,
VOL. II

by
Thomas Grady, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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1964

LIFE

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CHAPTER I

METAPHYSICS

The object of this paper is to present Josiah Royce's conception of the human self in his metaphysical framework. It would be best, then, to begin by giving a brief sketch of his metaphysics, insofar as it pertains to the human self. The word metaphysics is appropriate for referring to Royce's philosophy of being, since Royce clearly conceives of being as something beyond the physical, meta ta physika. Metaphysics, then, seems more in keeping with Royce's attitude than the more neutral word ontology. Moreover, Royce himself from time to time applies the word metaphysics to his doctrine.

If a thing is said to be real, existing, some notion of what is meant by the term being ought to be made explicit. Indeed, statements about real things will be significant in proportion to the vividness of one's conception of being. Thus, it is by no means otiose to begin this consideration of the human self by saying that it is a being. Indeed, for clear thinking, it must at the offset be asked what is being for Royce?

The history of philosophy shows that men have had diametrically opposed notions of what it means to be. A brief look at some such notions may bring to light the divergencies. Paul

Tillich speaks of being as an estrangement from God and, so, as sin. Thomas Aquinas speaks of being as a good in itself (omne ens est bonum). Immanuel Kant formally excludes being from his system, and Benedetto Croce does so incidentally. Bernard Lonergan, S.J. stresses the isomorphism between being and mind. Martin Heidegger, in his hermeneutic phenomenology, turns to temporality as constitutive of being itself. Sren Kierkegaard sees true being only in the light of the super-rational, and William James sees being only in the world of natural practicality.

Royce fully appreciates that being, as is evidenced in history, is not the same for all. He sees that any meaningful statement about the human self demands both a consideration of the historical meanings applied to the term being and an unambiguous indication of one's own meaning for the term.

I shall dwell upon the nature of Being, because to assert that God is, or that the World is, or even, with Descartes, that I am, implies that one knows what it is to be, or in other words, what the so-called existential predicate itself involves.¹

A. The Four Conceptions of Being

The various notions of being are considered by Royce under four types of which he rejects the first three and accepts the last as his own, "the Fourth Conception of Being." Our purpose here is not to defend or to condemn Royce's presentation of the various schools of ontology or to substantiate or to nullify his reasons

¹Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. I (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1959), p. 12.

for rejection. What is needed now is to present his arguments briefly so as to arrive at his conception of being, which is delineated by his rejections of the first three conceptions. Before we consider Royce's handling of each type of ontology, it would be good to see how Royce lines them up with one another:

But first let me name all the four. The mere list will not be very enlightening, but it will serve to furnish titles for our immediately subsequent inquiries. The first conception I shall call the technically Realistic definition of what it is to be. The second I shall call the Mystical conception. The third I cannot so easily name. I shall sometimes call it the typical view of modern Critical Rationalism. Just now I prefer to name it by its formulation, the conception of the real as the Truth, or, in the present day, usually, as the Empirically verifiable Truth. The fourth I shall call the Synthetic, or the constructively Idealistic conception of what it is to be. For the first conception, that is real which is simply Independent of the mere ideas that relate or that may relate to it. For this view, what is, is not only external to our ideas of it, but absolutely and independently decides as to the validity of such ideas. It controls or determines the worth of ideas, and that wholly apart from their or our desire or will. What we "merely think" makes "no difference" to fact. For the second conception, that is real which is absolutely and finally Immediate, so that when it is found, i.e. felt, it altogether ends any effort at ideal definition, and in this sense satisfies ideas as well as constitutes the fact. For this view, therefore, Being is the longed-for goal of our desire. For the third conception, that is real which is purely and simply Valid or True. Above all, according to the modern form of this view, that is real which Experience, in verifying our ideas, shows to be valid about these ideas. Or the real is the valid "Possibility of Experience." But for the fourth conception, that is real which finally presents in a completed experience the whole meaning of a System of Ideas.²

²Ibid., pp. 60-61.

1. Realism

The first type, the Realistic, places great stress on independence as a criterion for being. A major distinction is made, according to this school, between the "that" of a being and its "what." Imaginary beings have a "what" but no "that." If a being is independent of the idea (or concept) proper to it, then it has a "that"; it is real. What a thing is, then, does not signify that it is.

Truth, for the Realist, lies independent of man's apprehension. To get to it, man must escape from his mental confines. To get to it, man must escape from his mental confines, which are imposed upon him by the nature of his inner life of consciousness. The Realist conceives of a cleavage between the conceptual activity has no effect whatsoever on the existential world.

Now the first of our four conceptions of what it is to be real, essentially declares that if you thus know a real object, and if thereupon your knowledge vanishes from the world, that vanishing of your knowledge makes no difference, except by accident, or indirectly, to the real object that you know.³

The real, according to this first conception of being, is a given; it is not produced by any activity on man's part. Of course the real is not limited just to what can be sensed, for it may be an intelligibility which appears through sensible media. The real is grasped in ideas when those ideas escape any subjective pre-determination.

³Ibid., p. 66.

The act of knowing itself is a reality, since it has in itself an intelligibility which is independent of any extrinsic observer who views the act as an object of his knowing.

Hence the objects of realistic ontology are objects not necessarily outside of any knowledge whatever, but only independent of any knowing that is external to themselves.⁴

Men find it socially convenient to be realists, for then they can keep other men and things, by means of abstract categories, in an order which is independent of their personal actions. Their roles in society, then, are arbitrary in that they can participate as they will. The conservative mind is apt to accept realism because it preserves order in society. Indeed, the realist holds up this social order as a proof for his ontological system, on which he tends to take a position which persuades rather than demonstrates.

Royce finds the Realist's position of isolating the knower from the known hard to accept. Indeed, he feels that the strict dichotomy between the mental and existential order involves contradictions.

It [Realism] contradicts its own conceptions in uttering them. It asserts the mutual dependence of knowing and of Being in the very act of declaring Being independent.⁵

In the existential order, every being which exists is an individual. In the mental order, every concept is a universal.

⁴Ibid., p. 69.

⁵Ibid., p. 76.

Once the Realist has made the two orders independent, he can never have them united again. "Its [Realism's] laws, as universals, contradict its facts, which have to be independent individuals."⁶ The abstract thinking of the Realist does not depict the real individual but, at best, gives some linkage for systems of facts. The existent, even for the Realist, is a noumenon, which is itself a concept determined by a thinking process. Even that which is conceived as being totally independent of the mind is in fact defined by mind.

Royce feels that realism cannot claim to have real knowledge of existential facts. He says: "Its [Realism's] central technical difficulty . . . is that wondrous problem of the nature of individuality and as to the meaning of universals."⁷ Further, that knowers are independent from one another, Royce feels, is contradicted by experience. "This [Realistic] view of the social relation . . . is contradicted by every case of the communication of mind with mind."⁸ Independence here means that the knowers in knowing have no effect on one another.⁹ Independence in general means, for Royce, being devoid of relations.

2. Mysticism

Royce proceeds to the second conception of Being, Mysticism.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 73.

⁹Ibid., p. 61.

This is the ancient opponent of Realism. In itself Mysticism is more religious than philosophical, but underlying it is a definite philosophy. Many disregard Mysticism because, they feel, it substitutes feelings for reality. But they view it externally from a realist's position and, so, do not truly understand Mysticism.

The philosophical Mystic, usually, is one who has begun in Realism but then, since he found contradictions in it, has come to doubt it. The Mystic feels that ideas are false precisely because they are just ideas and not the reality. Reality is not to be found in profound ideas, but in the profundity of experience. The real, for the Mystic, can be had only immediately, that is, without the medium of ideas. "Or in other words, Reality is that which you can immediately feel when, thought satisfied, you cease to think."¹⁰

Royce calls the Mystic the only true empiricist, for the Mystic holds that all truth is to be found immediately. The knower and the known must become one for true knowledge. Because of that, thought is a defect, a step away from reality in the direction of illusion.

If it takes a trance to find such a fact, that is the fault of our human ignorance and baseness. The fact in question is always in you, is under your eyes. The ineffably immediate is always present. Only, in your blindness, you refuse to look at it, and prefer to think instead of illusions. The ineffably immediate is also, if you like, far above knowledge, but that is because¹¹ knowledge ordinarily means contamination with ideas.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 83.

¹¹Ibid.

The first two conceptions of being, which we have thus far considered, are polar opposites to each other.¹² Neither satisfy Royce because each presents in abstract terms only fragmentary views of reality. We will now look at Royce's reaction to each.

Royce puts a question to the Realist:

Does your world contain in just this sense Many different, that is mutually independent beings, or does it contain only One real being, whose inner structure, perhaps simply, perhaps infinitely complex, still permits of no mutual independence of parts.¹³

The Realist is now in a dilemma. Whichever horn he chooses, Royce feels that he can logically lead the Realist to inconsistency.

First, the Realist says that reality is made up of many beings. It should be recalled that for the Realist a being is that which is independent, in itself, apart from others. Royce now asks the Realist that leads him to say that beings are independent. The Realist replies that one sees in his experience that beings are independent. True, the Realist adds, independent beings do enter into relation with each other, e.g., through causality or love. That relation, indeed, is a fact, a reality, and as such it too is independent. How then, asks Royce, can a third independent bind two other independents.¹⁴ Obviously, it cannot.

¹²Ibid., p. 86.

¹³Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 128.

The Realist has turned to experience for evidence of his assertion that beings are many and independent. Precisely here, in experience, Royce feels that he has the Realist.

But now I distinctly decline to admit that, in our concrete human experience, you can ever show me any two physically real objects which are so independent of each other that no change in one of them need correspond to any change of the other.¹⁵

The laws of physics, as well as ethnical and ethical laws, indicate that there is a tight solidarity in the universe. Human experience, then, seems to give evidence against the Realist. Furthermore, Royce flatly states that the Realist is wrong in thinking that beings are originally independent and then later enter into a relation. One's awareness is what changes.

What happens when we say that they pass from mutual independence to linkage, is really that we find them, in our experience, passing from relations whose importance is merely to us less obvious, into relations of more obvious human interest. But now the relations of an object in ordinary experience make parts of the object itself.¹⁶

The Realist must admit now that beings cannot be many and, so, completely independent of one another, for it is seen in experience that beings are related. Since a being must be independent and since things are related in the world, the Realist would say that reality is just one being. However, Royce points out that monism is impossible for a Realist. "For let us remember that, as

¹⁵Ibid., p. 125.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 126.

we observed before, there are already at least Two genuinely and absolutely independent real Beings in the realistic world."¹⁷ The Realist must at least say that the real and his idea of it are both beings. Since they are independent of one another, they must be considered separate realities. But if the Realist's idea about the real is independent of the real, it cannot truly be an idea about the real.

The realistic theory, then, as we now know, by its own explicit consequences, and just because its real objects are totally independent of its ideas, has nothing to do with any independently real object, and has no relation to the independent external world that its own account defines.¹⁸

At this point, the Realist by the logical inferences in his own doctrine has nothing as the object of his philosophy. "In brief, the realm of a consistent Realism is not the realm of One nor yet the realm of Many, it is the realm of absolutely Nothing."¹⁹

No doubt, the realists among the readers will have ready many counter-arguments to meet Royce's reasoning. They will probably agree with William James when he referred to Royce's Realist as: "what an ass of a realist."²⁰ But whether Royce has depicted the Realist as being too naive or not is not the concern here. Rather, only a brief look at Royce's view on realism is wanted, in

¹⁷Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 137.

²⁰R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Vol. I (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), p. 818.

order to have a better understanding of what he will mean by his "Fourth Conception of Being."

The Mystic defines reality as that which is one with the knower. The unconscious Absolute becomes aware of itself in its finite aspects. At first, men falsely see themselves as distinct from their objects. Then, as mystics, they come to a stage of immediacy which satisfies all their ideas. Royce cannot bear with the aura of illusion about Mysticism.

It follows that if Mysticism is to escape from its own finitude, and really is to mean by its absolute Being anything but a Mere Nothing, its account of Being must be so amended as to involve the assertion that our finite life is not mere illusion, that our ideas are not merely false, and that we are already, even as finite, in touch with Reality.²¹

The Absolute for the Mystic has reality only in relation to the conscious striving of the finite toward the Absolute. Pure immediacy with the Absolute is the Mystic's goal. To achieve it he must renounce the illusions of his finite consciousness. In so doing he renders not only himself nothing, but the Absolute as well.

. . . we bring the mystic's case to its close, by pointing out that his Absolute, in its abstraction, is precisely as much, and in exactly the same sense of the terms a Nothing, as, by his hypothesis, his own consciousness is.²²

3. Critical Rationalism

The Third Conception of being identifies being with validity. That is valid which fits in a formal system. Its original exponent

²¹Royce, The World and the Individual, I, 182.

²²Ibid., p. 195.

is Kant.²³ A sharp separation is made between noumena and phenomena. By that separation the Critical Rationalist hopes to avoid the presumptions of other philosophies.

The truth, validity, or determinate possibility of the experience in question, may be, so far as yet appears, either transient or eternal, either relative or absolute, either something valid for a limited group of people, or something valid for all possible rational beings. But in any case, this third definition of Being attempts to identify the validity of the idea with the true Being of the fact defined by the idea.²⁴

Royce links many prominent philosophers with this Third Conception of Being: St. Augustine in identifying God with Veritas, St. Thomas in relating the Divine Ideas to God, Plato in holding a realm of essences, Aristotle in having the notion of possible being.²⁵

Precisely on the central theme of the Third Conception, on the identification of validity and being, Royce finds fault.

Now what our Third Conception so far fails to explain to us is precisely the difference between the reality that is to be attributed to the valid truths that we do not get concretely verified in our own experience, and the reality observed by us when we do verify ideas.²⁶

Furthermore, since being appears only universally for the Third Conception, the self knowing cannot be a being. But the self, which certainly is individual, must be a being to ground, as the knower,

²³Ibid., p. 205.

²⁴Ibid., p. 227.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 228-29.

²⁶Ibid., p. 260.

the being of his ideas.²⁷ The Third Conception of Being actually does not lay claim to know any reality which would be more than a construction of the mind. Given the human situation, man at best, according to the Third Conception, can come to a clarity of thought. By reflecting on the structure of his mind, man can see his process of categorization. Then, he can more precisely classify his data. Since all men have the same mental structure, the greater the precision in thinking the greater will be the uniformity in the community of human knowledge.

But I point out that their reality, the true Being of these objects, is in no wise defined when you merely speak of the ideas as nothing but valid, because the assertion of validity is so far merely the assertion of a correspondence between a presupposed idea and its assumed object, without any account as yet either of the object, or of the truth of the idea.²⁸

The critical rationalist is satisfied in conceiving reality in an "as if" manner. He feels that although one can never know the really real one can pretend as if he does, because practical living demands such a pretense.

Our critical rationalist lives in a world where nothing in the realistic sense is real, but where it is as if there were independent realities, which, when more closely examined, prove to be merely more or less valid and permanent ideas.²⁹

4. The Synthesis

The considerations of the previous three conceptions of being

²⁷Ibid., p. 261.

²⁸Ibid., p. 352.

²⁹Ibid., p. 243.

lead to Royce's own conception, the Fourth. In it he has incorporated the significant elements of the other conceptions. At the same time, he feels, he has by means of his synthesis overcome the contradictions which are the logical outcome of the other conceptions of being.

The real, for Royce, cannot be an isolated fact. It cannot be a totally independent other. It cannot be an undifferentiated one. It cannot be a valid universal. The real is a unique, unified system of ideas, which are embodiments of will in that their existence is their purpose. "What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."³⁰

For Royce, idea does not mean just a representation. Rather it is also an embodiment of purpose:

But the primary character, which makes it an idea, is not this its representative character, is not its vicarious assumption of the responsibility of standing for a being beyond itself, but is its inner character as relatively fulfilling the purpose (that is, as presenting the partial fulfilment of the purpose), which is in the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place.³¹

The meaning of an idea has two aspects: the internal and the external. The internal meaning refers to the subjective aspect of the idea, i.e., the reason why the knower wishes or wills to have this particular idea.

³⁰Ibid., p. 339.

³¹Ibid., p. 24.

Now this purpose, just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the contents and in the form of the complex state called the idea, constitutes what I shall hereafter call the Internal Meaning of the Idea.³²

The external meaning refers to the objective aspect of the idea, i.e., to external referent of the idea. For example, in the statement "John loves Mary," the external meaning is the fulfilment of John's wish to love this unique person, Mary. At first, the external meaning seems to transcend completely the internal.³³ However, Royce sees a definite continuity between the two meanings. Indeed, the external actually has significance only as an internal meaning.

In other words, we shall find either that the external meaning is genuinely continuous with the internal meaning, and is inwardly involved in the latter, or else that the idea has no external meaning at all.³⁴

We shall assert, in the end, that the final meaning of every complete idea, when fully developed, must be viewed as wholly an internal meaning, and that all apparently external meanings become consistent with internal meanings only by virtue of thus coming to be viewed as aspects of the true internal meaning.³⁵

Mary in her internal meaning is the determined correlate to John's internal meaning. So, in this sense, Mary is by no means a neutral object with respect to the active subject, John. Rather, both in accord with their own internal meanings act harmoniously.

³²Ibid., p. 25.

³³Ibid., p. 27

³⁴Ibid., p. 33.

³⁵Ibid., p. 34.

In other words, Mary has external meaning for John only because of her and his internal meanings.

Reality, then, is the fulfilment of will,³⁶ for, it will be seen, will determines internal meanings. The intellect in seeking the truth of being must look for an appreciation of the internal meaning of being.

A will concretely embodied in a life,--and these meanings identical with the very purposes that our poor fleeting finite ideas are even now so fragmentarily seeking, amidst all their flickerings and their conflicts, to express,--this, I say, is the reality.³⁷

In his Fourth Conception, Royce thinks that he has incorporated the good points of the other conceptions. With his synthesis, he has overcome the intrinsic contradictions of the others.

Realism in its definition of being has laid great weight on "other." "Other" assumes the authority over ideas. "Other" is the criterion for truth or falsity. Royce agrees with the Realist in that "other" is a constitutive of a finite idea. "The finite idea does seek its own Other."³⁸ However, this "other" is not something totally independent of the finite idea (nor, also, of the one who has the idea). Their being, that of the "other" and that of the idea, is so bound together that it cannot be separated. (This will become clearer in connection with the Absolute.) "Yet the idea submits to no external meaning that is not the development

³⁶Ibid., II, 432.

³⁷Ibid., I, 359.

³⁸Ibid., p. 353.

of its own meaning."³⁹ Clearly, the idea is dependent on the "other" for its whatness and the fact that it is. Not so clear now, perhaps, is that the "other" is dependent on the idea for both its whatness and its existence. The "other," however, achieves its purpose, and so has its being, only as fulfilling its own internal meaning. If its internal meaning is precisely to be the complement to a finite idea, then it is dependent on that idea for its whatness and its existence.

The opposite pole of Realism, Mysticism, has held to the complete identification of being in one. The Fourth Conception of Being stresses, also, the unity of being in that everything that is is a fulfilment of purpose which flows from the one will of the Absolute. Thus, the mystical identification of the world and the Absolute Self has been in a modified form incorporation into the Fourth Conception.

The Fourth Conception of Being agrees with critical rationalism in that being gives validity to ideas. "The valid finite idea is first, for whoever possess it, an observed and empirical fulfilment of purpose."⁴⁰ However, the Fourth Conception would not equate the idea with the "other." Indeed, precisely insofar as the "other" is not defined, just so far it is not that finite idea and is the "other." The "other" has its own internal meaning which, it will be seen is derived from Will.

³⁹Ibid., p. 354.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 356.

What therefore you have not thus defined is precisely the Being of the object as Other than the very finite idea which is to regard it as an Other. If you have once observed this defect of any assertion of a bare possibility of experience, you will have seen why the mere definition of universal types can never reach the expression of the whole nature of real Beings, and why, for that very reason, the realm of Validity is nothing unless it is more than merely valid, nothing too unless it takes an individual form as an unique fulfilment of purpose in a completed life.⁴¹

The real cannot be satisfied by universals devoid of volitional characteristics.

The essence of the Real is to be Individual, or to permit no other of its own kind, and this character it possesses only as the unique fulfilment of purpose.⁴²

His dissatisfaction with the other conceptions of being has lead Royce into his own conception. In this framework, will gives reality its significance, which intellect must appreciate. The real, then, is freed from intellectual abstraction. The real, to be real, must be individual, just as the will in willing must will uniquely a unique fulfilment of its willing.

This final form of the idea, this final object sought when we seek Being, is (1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the finite idea with which, in any case, we start our quest; (2) a complete fulfilment of the will or purpose partially embodied in this idea; (3) an individual life for which no other can be substituted.⁴³

With this sketch of Royce's metaphysics, it is hoped that the presentation of his notion of the individual human self will be

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 357-58.

⁴²Ibid., p. 348.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 340-41.

more intelligible. Also, in the course of the presentation it is hoped that the Fourth Conception of Being will become more meaningful, especially as the function of the Absolute is brought to light

We can therefore lay aside altogether our ifs and thens, our validity and our other such terms, when we speak of this final concept of Being. What is, is for us no longer a mere Form, but a Life; and in our world of what was before mere truth the light of individuality and of will have finally begun to shine.⁴⁴

B. Absolute--finite polarity

The relation between the Absolute and finite beings must now be reviewed. Since the human self takes on its true significance only in relation to the Absolute, some understanding of that relation must be had. Is Royce here speaking in the context of logic, of epistemology, of psychology, of religion, or of metaphysics? In some sense he is in each context. He is in a metaphysical context when he talks of the Absolute--finite relation.

All finite beings are expressions of the Absolute. The Absolute is the integral whole of the finite beings. The finite being has its existence only as fulfilling that role in the total expression which the Absolute wills to it. For free beings, the perfect expression of the Absolute's will is their ideal selves. The Absolute is, then, completely immanent in the finite expressions. Nevertheless, the Absolute is not dependent on any particular finite being or group of beings for its existence or its form. It finds its expression in the finite beings. The form of the total

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 342.

expression and that it exists at all, however, is contingent on the Absolute's will. Should a free agent fail in achieving its ideal self, the Absolute compensates for the corresponding void in its expression through another finite being.

To be, we have said, means to fulfil a purpose, in fact, to fulfil in final, individual expression, the only purpose, namely, the Absolute purpose. Our closer study has shown us that this Absolute purpose is not only One, but also infinitely complex, so that its unity is the unity of many Wills, each one of which finds its expression in an individual life, while these lives, as the lives of various Selves, have an aspect in which they are free, in so far as each, while in many aspects determined, is still in its own measure a determiner of all the rest.⁴⁵

All internal meanings of ideas, then, are subsumed under the Absolute's will. All external meanings are ultimately significant only in terms of internal meanings, which are harmonized in the one will of the Absolute. Thus, all meaning in the world flows from the Absolute who wills its expression, which is itself, to be such as it is or will be.

Many is the Absolute, because in the interrelationships of contrasted expressions of a single Will lies the only opportunity for the embodiment of wholeness of life, and for the possession of Self-consciousness by the Absolute.⁴⁶

To be a being, then implies uniqueness and individuality. A being is only insofar as it fulfils a particular purpose of the Absolute. Since a purpose must be unique and individual, an expression of that purpose must be unique and individual. Without

⁴⁵Ibid., II, 335-36.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 336.

uniqueness with respect to purpose there can be no individuation. Since beings obviously are individuated on the finite level as expressions, they must be unique.

Individuals are all various expressions of the Absolute, in so far as they are Many; just because, where the One is individual, every aspect and element of its self-expression is unique.⁴⁷

The Absolute is in eternity, which is the totality of times past, present, and future. The finite expression is essentially temporal; that is to say, it is always limited to a particular time.

For the sake of clarification, a parallel can be made. The Absolute is like a man; the finite expressions are like the man's ideas. The man freely chooses his ideas (he at least has freedom of exercise). The ideas make the man who he is. Ultimately, the ideas are only for the sake of the man, that he may be with such a determination or form. Of themselves, the ideas are nothing; they have no significance but in relation to the man. The man's consciousness of himself transcends any particular moment of being. The ideas are located in time. The man knows his ideas in relation to a time. The man would be different if he had chosen a different idea or set of ideals. Thus, the man is independent of any particular ideas, whereas the ideas are totally dependent on the man. However, the man needs ideas to express his selfhood, to be himself.

Admittedly, the above parallel has much of the tone of psychology in it. However, it should be kept in mind that Royce is not a Realist. He is an Idealist. To be is to be an expression

⁴⁷ Ibid.

of the Absolute, to be, in a sense, his idea, which fulfils a purpose that the Absolute wills for himself. In such a framework, the realist's clear-cut distinction between the purely psychological and the ontological fades. Thus, what sounds like psychology in the realist's terminology is actually metaphysical in Royce's.

Of course, the parallel limps. The so-called ideas of the Absolute, i.e., finite beings, can have their own consciousness and power to will. That is possible because the Absolute has so willed this expression. Indeed, Royce would say that perhaps things to which we do not ordinarily attribute consciousness actually in the scheme other than the human have consciousness. If we were to experience a million years as a moment, then, perhaps, so-called inanimate things would seem to have consciousness. Since to be is to fulfil purpose and since the purpose in the animal kingdom is fulfilled by the species rather than the individual, then, perhaps, viewed in a different scheme an animal species as a unit would take on the characteristics of a person. But such speculations are hardly the chief concerns of Royce. Primarily, he is interested in the human person, whose consciousness we experience in ourselves and in other men.

C. World of Appreciation--World of Description

Royce divides the world of men into two aspects. One is the World of Appreciation; the other is the World of Description.

The World of Appreciation is that of internal meaning. The true reality of a being is its internal meaning. Insofar as he is an expression of the Absolute's will, that being is an ontological

reality. Thus, if one is to appreciate reality he must become aware of the internal meanings of things. Indeed, if one is to appreciate himself as a self he must become aware of his own internal meaning, as an expression of the Absolute. When one does become aware of his ideal self as it is determined by the Absolute, then and only then can he make real progress in his self-development. Then and only then is he conscious of himself as belonging to the World of Appreciation.

It is known from psychology, and indeed from common experience, that children tend to have a self-centered view of reality. The child sees things and persons only in relation to himself. Only after a long and arduous period of maturation, which lasts his whole lifetime, does the child become adult enough to see others as beings-in-themselves. Of course, some always retain a childish view of the world, that others are only in relation to them. Such people usually spend their last days in prisons or, if they are extreme enough in their attitudes, in insane asylums.

The true world, the World of Values or of Appreciation, as rightly viewed by an absolute insight, would be a world of Selves, forming in the unity of their systems One Self.⁴⁸

So strong is the egocentric attitude in man that only after much attention to the reality of others does one come to an appreciation of their internal meanings. One must transcend the external meaning of other, in order to come to an appreciation of other

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 106.

as an expression of the Absolute in its own uniqueness and individuality. In the statement, John loves Mary, it was pointed out, the external meaning was that Mary as being loved by John. Mary is the referent for the idea, true; but she is only insofar as she is loved by John. John could love her for many reasons, which would come out in the internal meaning of the statement. John's love would actually be self-love if he does not transcend to the level of appreciation for Mary in her otherness. To appreciate Mary, John must become aware of her internal meaning. That infinitely rich and intricate meaning, which is an integral part of the Absolute's expression of himself, will never be comprehended by John. He must, nevertheless, approach such an appreciation of Mary, and of everything else, also. Only in that way can he truly know reality. Only in that way can he become himself.

The World of Description, the second aspect of man's world, is the world of science, of validity, of universals. Man classifies beings in the World of Description so that he can get a better hold on them for his own uses. Here the other is seen only as having, or possibly having, some relation to the man. Men agree among themselves on their classifications for the sake of communication. Need leads them to categorize certain beings under a certain type. Thus, in the World of Description reality has a much watered down significance. The external meaning, seen as universal and pertinent to men in general, has the prominent position in the World of Description. Nevertheless, it would seem that many men live in the

World of Description whole-heartedly without the least inclining towards the World of Appreciation. These men cannot develop themselves as men. They are living in an unreal world of their own formulation.

The truly human man will see the World of Description for what it is. He will submit to its conventions. He will organize data of his science along the lines of interest prescribed by the World of Description. However, the truly human man will not be deceived into thinking that that is the whole of reality. Indeed he will live his life in the World of Appreciation in conjunction with the Absolute.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN SELF DEFINED

Descartes established the existence of the self by his famous formula "cogito, ergo sum." Of course, presenting the bare existence of the self says little of its nature. Is the self a unique individual, or is it a logical form? Is it the summation of its empirical situations, or is it a transcendental absolute?

Royce may be said to have followed up Descartes' phrase with a similar one: sum in quantum volo. When one in looking for certainty, for reality, sublates the senses, he tends to identify self with thought or will. For Royce, will is the keynote for self. However, it is not a blind will. Somewhat like Aristotle's telos, Royce regards will as an intrinsic constitutive of the self and as depending on intellectual understanding for its guidance. Royce combines the volitional and intellectual character of the self in the concept of purpose, which is the ultimate reality of the self.

Kant saw, too, that purpose is the highest unifying principle and that men tend to attribute the order about them to some purpose-giving Absolute.

This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purposive unity of things. The speculative interest of reason makes it necessary

to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the purpose of a supreme reason.¹

It will be seen that Royce does just that. But he does not bury the self in an abstract system of validity. Royce is ever concerned with the concrete; for him, to be, one must be an individual. He strongly recoils from philosophical explanations which are lacking in humanistic appreciation.²

Now that there is, from the first chapter, some notion of Royce's metaphysical orientation, this chapter will present Royce's definition of the human self. It will formulate Royce's definition around three aspects of the self: that the self is (1) individual, (2) unique, (3) self-identical and self-identifying. Finally, then, Royce's own term person will be applied to the subsistent human self.

The focal point of this chapter is the person. A later chapter will look to the relation between the person and the Absolute, between the person and his world and the total community, and also the relation between persons.

The World and the Individual, Vol. II contains the core of Royce's thought about the human self. Perhaps, he may in later works explicate the consequences of his metaphysics of the human self with respect to areas of social living; but, in the World and

¹Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 560.

²Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1892), p. 24.

the Individual, Vol. II, his notion of the human self is essentially expressed. In his preface to the second Volume he indicates what he will say:

From Nature these lectures pass to the Human Self. Characteristic of this part of the argument, and of previous statements of my own upon the same topic, are: my entire willingness to lay aside all assertion of the existence of a substantial Soul; my unreserved acceptance of the empirical evidence regarding the dependence of the Human Self, for its temporal origin, for its development, and for its preservation in its present form of life, upon physical and social conditions; and my insistence that various Selves can possess, in the whole or in a part of their lives, identically the same experiences, so that one Self can originate, or can develop within another Self, and so that the lives of various Selves can be interwoven in the most complex ways.³

Royce appreciates the fact that the greatest stumbling block to an idealistic philosophy is the problem of individuation.⁴ However, he feels that much of the ground has been cleared in his First Volume. He will express his notion of the human self in his metaphysical framework. This chapter will try, then, to look with Royce as he focuses on the human self. "The former lectures emphasized the World; the present course shall be directed towards an understanding of the Human Individual."⁵

1. Individual

The human self for Royce is an individual. Although such an insight may seem trite to the layman, to those more acquainted with

³Royce, The World and the Individual, II, xii.

⁴Ibid., p. xiii.

⁵Ibid., p. 4.

the history of philosophy the insight is of consequence. The ultimate reality of the human person, from Kant through Hegel, has evolved as the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego, stripped of all the individuating characteristics of the empirical ego, welds the reality of men into a one. What is nonsense to the layman of everyday experience is seen by the philosophers as a brilliantly worked out logical system, which can hardly be discarded with a word of rebuttal.

Royce, who was fully aware of the doctrines of his predecessors, has come out boldly in the opposite direction. Royce says that for anything to be real it must be individual.⁶ Indeed, the ultimate reality of a being is found in his individuality. No transcendental sphere, where content is spurned in order to get some pure form, is the seat of the real for Royce. No universal nature, which stands aloof from the concrete perfections of finite man, is given as the real truth of man by Royce. Royce, foreshadowing the existentials, has given to the concrete individual the prime place in reality.

What is the principle of individuation for Royce? At a deeper level, the question may be phrased: what is the principle of being for Royce, since to be means to be individual. The principle of individuation is purpose. Purpose gives one his reality which cannot be that of another, for if it were then the other would be himself, i.e., the other would not be other.

⁶Ibid., I, 297.

The purpose of each finite being is determined by the Absolute. It has been seen already that the finite beings are expressions of the Absolute. The purpose of the Absolute in expressing himself in this particular way and not in another gives to the finite being both its existence and its individuality. If the Absolute in two instances wanted to express himself in the very same way, then there would be only one finite being. Thus, the reality of one being cannot encroach on another's.

Perhaps a contradiction appears here to those who have not investigated the matter further with Royce. If the finite beings are just expressions of the Absolute, doesn't that deny the very possibility of individuation for finite beings? Furthermore, if an ethical self is in a sense infinite, does that mean that he has to be the same as the Absolute?

This is Royce's paradigm in the form of a table which will be set up for what Royce in the text expresses in words:

	B						
A	1	2	3	4	.	.	.
A ¹	2	4	8	16	.	.	.
A ²	3	9	27	81	.	.	.
A ³	5	25	125	625	.	.	.
A ⁴	7	49	343	2401	.	.	.
A ⁵	11	121
A ⁶	13	169

Row A is the set of whole numbers. The dots indicate that the series goes to infinity. Column B is the set of prime numbers. Prime numbers cannot be factored into more basic numbers. This set also goes to infinity. Corresponding to each number of A, the whole numbers, is each prime number raised to that power indicated by the whole number. Because prime numbers are basic no element in a set a_n will be the same as an element in another set a_m . However, all the elements of every set a will appear in A.

The first set, A, contains all the numbers of the other sets, yet it is an individual set in its own right. Such a set may be compared to the Absolute. The second set, a_1 , which is a sub-set of the first, contains no elements which can be found in any of the other sets, a_2 . . ., but only in the first one, A. So it is with each of the sub-sets. Each set from the second to the infinith, a_1 to a_∞ , is contained in the first, A; but in no way, partially or totally, is a sub-set contained in any of the other sub-sets of the first, A.

It is seen from the example clearly enough that none of the sub-sets can be a part of another sub-set. In a similar way, each finite being is individuated from other finite beings by its own characteristic form determined by its purpose. Nevertheless, with respect to the Absolute the problem remains. How can the finite being be individuated from the Absolute? That's the point. It is not. The finite being is individuated in the Absolute. The sub-sets each appear in the first, A. Each sub-set has an intelligibility

of its own, and so it is individual. The first set has an intelligibility of its own, which is not the same as that of the summation of the sub-sets, because it is a whole in itself. Also, there are many more possible sub-sets other than those based on the primes. Therefore, it is seen that the first set A, is an individual and that the others are also individuals, even while they appear in the first set. Each sub-set, by the way, has an infinite number of elements; yet, it only partially mirrors A, which also has an infinite number of elements. The ethical self is infinite in that, because a finite being is essentially temporal, it will never be fully expressed. (That the sets appear on different lines when they are put on paper ought not to lead one into thinking that the sub-sets exist apart from the first set.)

For Royce, to be is to fulfil purpose. If there is an identity of God and finite beings, it is a formal one. In other words, if the finite enters into the being of the Absolute by helping it achieve its purpose, then they have some identity. "The identity of the finite and the Absolute meaning is, for us, now mere identity without difference."⁸

Here is an analogy contrived by this author, which may help to bring out Royce's idea. Suppose each cell of the body was conscious of its activity in the integral body. Suppose each member of the body was conscious of its activity, which is beyond the collective activity of the cells. The person, as the self which

⁸Ibid., p. 369.

integrates the parts into a harmonious whole, has a consciousness of his activity as the composite and, also, the consciousness of the parts which he is.

If the above be admitted for the sake of clarification of Royce's notion of the Absolute--finite beings relationship, some problems concerning identity may be resolved. First, it is seen that this relation of identity is not reciprocal. The cell, from the point of view of the whole, can be said to be the man. At the same time, from the point of view of the cell itself, it can be said to have its own proper identity. However, it cannot be said that the man is the cell. Indeed, to say that the man is the summation of all his cells and members with their respective consciousness would not be enough, for the man as an integral body is conscious of himself as a one. The whole is more than the sum of parts. Man is identical with the Absolute, for his achieving being is the expression of the Absolute, which is the Absolute itself. But the Absolute is not the man. Man, becoming himself in time, has a transcendental relation to the infinite Absolute, who stands completely expressed in eternity.

The absolute finds its expression in the finite expressions (which can be syncategorematically infinite); yet, it has an intelligibility over and beyond a multiplicity of finite expressions. It as an integral whole is an individual. But each of these finite expressions has an intelligibility of its own in the Absolute. Each is an individual. Individuation can be appreciated only in the

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intellectual sphere: "All truth is the object of acknowledgement, and not merely of immediate experience. . . . And the senses never show us individuality," ⁹ Nevertheless, the human intellect cannot comprehend individuality. Essentially, individuality is a characteristic derived from will. Only the Absolute comprehends his will and, so, the individuality of finite beings. ¹⁰

The intelligibility which individuates the finite being as it appears in the Absolute is its purpose. Because that principle flows from an intelligent Will, the heart of reality ought to be conceived as not just rational, but also volitional. Correspondingly, reality is known, not by intellect alone, but by an enlightened will in an act of appreciative love. The bare intellect can come to an understanding of reality's structure. A loving will is in contact with the full reality, a structure enriched with individuality. The Absolute in choosing a specific purpose for himself brings into actuality an individual. That purpose ordained by the Absolute's will, which is the internal meaning of the individual, comes to be known in love.

Royce would associate universality with intellect and individuality with will, as also Marcel, Croce, Sturzo, and others seem to have done. So it is that the individual can only be appreciated as individual by an act of the will, viz., love. The reality of the individual lies in the realm of will. For the intellect,

⁹Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 432.

then, reality will always be beyond full comprehension, will be a mystery.¹¹ But, of course, that is said from the finite position. To the Absolute, the world is comprehensible because he is the one who has ordered it. In fact, the world can be only insofar as it is ordered by the Absolute, who eternally gives each temporal individual his purpose.¹² Ultimately reality is rational, but its parts must be seen in the whole, and only the Absolute can do that completely. For finite beings, Royce will say in his later philosophy, the ultimate reality cannot be had in sense-perception or in abstract conception, but only in "interpretation," only in a sympathetic appreciation.

The free will of the Absolute chooses to express itself in one finite expression among the many possible choices. Thus, the finite being springs into existence and is individual.

Yet this my whole meaning, while one with His meaning, remains, in the eternal world, still this unique and individual meaning, which the life of no other individual Self possesses. So that in my eternal expression I lose not my individuality, but rather win my only genuine individual expression, even while I find my oneness with God.¹³

The human self is individual, of course, because it is a being. However, the individuating purpose need not be satisfied in the existing man; indeed, because man is essentially temporal,¹⁴

¹¹Ibid., p. 433.

¹²Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 380.

¹³Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 150.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 428.

the purpose cannot be satisfied. Man must try to fulfil his purpose which is assigned to him by the Absolute. How he becomes aware of his purpose will be explained later. In trying to satisfy the Absolute's purpose he is making himself more an individual.

"More" is in the sense that his life is unified and so controlled in its direction that no other can lay hold of it as its own.

"Meanwhile, I cannot too strongly insist that, in our present form of human consciousness, the true Self of any individual man is not a datum, but an ideal."¹⁵

Here one may well take exception to Joseph Blau's interpretation of Royce's notion of individuality. He seems to infer that the ultimate reality of the self is its dissolution in the Absolute. "Personal independence is but a temporary stage whose ultimate aim is the realization of the universal will."¹⁶ He regards temporality as a mere stage of the finite self as it progresses towards its eternal fusion in the Absolute. It has been shown in this paper that the finite self for Royce retains its individuality while existing only in the Absolute. Eternity is for the Absolute, as temporality needs to be part of the very make-up of a finite self. If the finite self is eternal, then it must be eternally temporal.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 287.

¹⁶Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosophy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 211.

B. Unique

The human self is unique. No other is like him, nor can any other be like him. That which makes him an individual also makes him unique. Each individual has a unique purpose, which makes him individual. As individuals, finite beings are materially distinct; as unique entities, they are formally distinct. Since in Royce's idealistic philosophy the distinction of matter and form dissolves, to be an individual means to a unique individual.

And individuals are not kept asunder by chasms, but are made distinct through their various meanings, i.e. through the variety of the purposes¹⁷ of which their lives are the expression.

Each human self has a unique identity. Who he is can never be the who he is of another. Logically, in Royce's system each self must be unique. If one self finds its identity in relation to all others, even if they be infinite in number, then one of the others cannot have the very same identity. If a set, be it infinite or finite, has elements x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots , the set of x_1 's complementary elements (all those elements of the basic set which are not x_1) cannot be the set of x_2 's complementary elements. Since x_1 is defined by its complementary elements, as x_2 is by its, etc., x_1 is a unique element in the basic set.

Since man is essentially temporal, according to Royce, each man must be unique. Obviously, two men cannot appear at the same time and in the same place. If this were to happen, then Royce

¹⁷Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 239.

would say, according to his definitions, that there really is only one man. If the men appear at different times, then each has a different history behind him and a different future ahead of him. Their worlds are different; thus, the men, too, must be different. If the men appear at the same time in different places, they are different. The same goal, the same self, the same identity, cannot be achieved in different places, for there is at least a local differentiation. Each human self is unique, therefore. The complexity of the human self makes his uniqueness all the more evident.

Uniqueness gives to man a special tie with the Absolute. The Absolute can be what he is, his expression can be such, only because each man is who he is. If a certain man were not, the Absolute would not be less, but he would be different from what he is if the man does exist. An infinite series would still be infinite if one of the elements were dropped, but it would not be the same series.

Universal natures, then, are categories for classification. Because of the similarity in the purposes of certain finite beings, they can be grouped under the heading "men." Men do not have the same universal form; they have their own proper unique forms which approximate one another in kind. "The uniqueness of my meaning is the one essential fact about me."¹⁸

The value of the human person flows, not from some abstract

¹⁸Ibid., p. 426.

essence, but from the individual's unique role in the very make-up of reality. For Royce, everything as well as everyone is a good. If it is, then it is fulfilling a unique purpose; and, so, it is in itself a good.

C. Identity.

Every man has an identity proper to himself; yet, no man has attained his full identity. Because he is a unique individual, every man can say that he has an identity, that he is somebody, that he has who-ness, that there is meaning for him in the term "I." Who is he? Now, he is the integral sum of his striving to fulfil his unique purpose. "For the Self in its entirety is the whole of a self-representative or recurrent process, and not the mere last moment or stage of that process."¹⁹ But the present ego is not his full identity. "I am not one with my own eternal individuality. . . ."²⁰ He is also the he who is in progress toward an ideal self, the perfect fulfilment of his purpose.²¹ Therefore, both the past acts of self-acquiring and his limit point, his ideal self, give him his identity. His ideal self gives his striving direction. In his subjective sphere, the ideal self does what purpose does in the objective sphere. The ideal self and unique purpose are two ways of looking at the same thing. Both give direction

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 135.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 149.

²¹ Paul Russell Anderson and Max Harold Fisch, Philosophy in America (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), p. 507.

and make possible development in personal identity.

There is, then, for each human being an identity peculiar to him. Because each has a unique purpose, he cannot become other than the ideal self which the Absolute wills for him. Man's option is to be or not to be. He cannot choose to be this or that. All moral choices either help one on toward his goal or not. It will be seen later than men do not have to have some sort of supernatural revelation to see who they should be or what they should do in a particular situation. Because the individual is situated in one set of circumstances, there is but one corresponding perfect choice for him at a particular time and place. Other choices in that situation must be less good than the one which would put the individual in perfect harmony with his community. There are many possible choices because the person is free to act to the extent that he wishes. The possible choices vary quantitatively, then, and not qualitatively. In short, for an individual in a given circumstance there is one ideal choice and many of less worth which, nevertheless, can be termed good because they do approach the ideal. Bad choices are those which appear on the continuum of possible choices as rather distant from the ideal. An absolutely bad choice is inconceivable, for no one can so go against himself as to will evil per se for himself.

Man is given his identity as potential in the sense that he has in himself a character which is unlike anyone else's. That character is ultimately what makes him to be who he is. It is not

a fluid, empirical determination, which can be only superficial to the true identity of the purpose. That character, which is determined by the individual's unique purpose, is his core. "In God you possess your individuality. Your very dependence is the condition of your freedom, and of your unique significance."²²

Man is not given his identity as actual. He must acquire his who-ness by exercising his free will. Man becomes who he is by deliberately choosing to be rather than not to be. He must choose to be real, to play his role in reality, to fulfil his unique purpose or to be petty, to cease to function as an integral part of reality, to deny his purpose as his.

But, too, you will know that you are a Self precisely in so far as you intend to accomplish God's will by becoming one; and that you are an individual precisely in so far as you purpose to do your Father's business in unique fashion, so that in this instant shall begin a work that can be finished only in eternity,--a work that, however closely bound up it may be with all the rest of the divine life, still remains in its expression distinguishable from all this other life.²³

The human self for Royce is essentially moral. In fact only by functioning as a moral agent does the self acquire actuality. The self can develop only in the light of the ideal self, only when the shallowness of the empirical self is seen as inadequate.²⁴ How

²²Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 417.

²³Ibid., p. 277.

²⁴Moses Judah Aronson, La Philosophie Morale De Josiah Royce (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1927), p. 121.

the self comes to an awareness of its ideal will be taken up in a later chapter.

Man is self-identical, then, in that he is a unique individual. Man is self-identifying in that he must acquire for himself his own reality.

D. Person

Man is a person because he is self-conscious in that he is aware of himself as the direction of his activities.²⁵ When he has evaluated the possible courses of action in the light of his purpose, he, then, can will his choice into act.

For Royce, man is not a mere functionary, for each human self is conscious of itself as a good in itself. True, the actual acquiring of identity will demand that the self function as an integral member of the whole, which is manifest in one way by society. Nevertheless, the functioning is not conceived of as a good in itself, but rather the individual, alone, is a good in himself. So, also, the Absolute as an individual, not as a collective system, is a good in himself. The functioning of the individuals, then, is necessary but a secondary value, from the point of view of man. The universe is not a vast machine, some of whose parts happen to be free. The universe has in its composition persons, subsistent values. Indeed, all the individuals in the universe are in some way conscious, and so are persons. "The Unconscious we reject,

²⁵Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 425.

because our Fourth Conception of Being forbids all recognition of unconscious realities."²⁶ Man is distinctive as a class of beings because the specific purposes of each member are approximately similar. Since man is the best known of all the classes, Royce concentrates his philosophy on human beings and admits his ignorance of the other classes.

It was pointed out earlier that Royce sees no contradiction in retaining individuality for that which is a part of another individual. So, then, men remain persons although they are only the expressions of the Absolute Person.

People commonly tend to formulate their first concept of the individual or self on an unreflective level where identity is in terms of the empirical, but they cannot rest in this naive position. They usually choose one of three further explanations, two of which are realistic, corresponding to the first conception of being, and the third idealistic, corresponding to the fourth conception of being. The first way is directly empirical. It holds that the full explanation of a man's self is on the empirical level, which is given immediately in experience, and that there is no other level.²⁷ This path fails to give an account of how it is that something of the individual self is permanent amid the flux of the empirical world.²⁸ In other words, it fails to give a full

²⁶ Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 241.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 257.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 260.

explanation of the self.

The second possible path, which leads beyond the initial unreflective conception of the self, is the metaphysical. The self is here defined in terms of independence. The majority of philosophers in the past have taken this route. Royce cannot follow Realism here. The self is not a thing, a compartmentalized entity, e.g., a substance.²⁹ Royce strongly refuses to put the ultimate reality of the individual in some airy entity or principle, which can only be alluded to but is of little import to the existing of the individual. He rejects the notion of substance as being such a principle. Also, the idea of Monads goes contrary to Royce's, because it fails to view the individual as one constitutionally related to other.³⁰ The material chasms, which for that sort of realist define individuality, separate individuals so that community, which is an actual fact, is impossible.

With the passing of the realistic explanation of the self, Royce's own comes forward: "A Meaning embodied in a conscious life."³¹ This third path is the strictly idealistic one. The reality of the self lies in its internal meaning, as fulfilling purposes.

²⁹Ibid., p. 268.

³⁰Ibid., p. 238.

³¹Ibid.

The first conception of being, Realism, because of its inherent inability to give a satisfactory definition of the person, has led Royce to formulate his own. The second and third conception of being, Mysticism, does not find much of a problem in defining the individual self. For Mysticism, the individual is an illusion, a dream.³² The third conception of being, Critical Rationalism, thinks that it can fully explain the individual self in terms of validity with respect to a system. The self is an autonomous system of validity.

The defect of Critical Rationalism lies in the consequences of its essentially abstract and impersonal view of Being. The Self, in this sense, is a law rather than a life; and³³ type of existence rather than an Individual.

Royce wishes to retain all the characteristics of a free, social, self-developing self, while he sees the self's reality in a concrete system, the Absolute.

And since the Self is precisely, in its wholeness, the conscious and intentional fulfilment of this divine purpose, in its own unique way, the individual will of the Self is not wholly determined by a power that fashions it as clay is fashioned and that is called God's will; but, on the contrary, what the Self in its wholeness wills is, just in so far, God's will, and is identical with one of the many expressions implied by a single divine purpose, so that, for the reasons already set forth, in general, in the closing lecture of the foregoing series, the Self is in its innermost individuality, not an independent, but still a Free Will, which in so far owns no external Master, despite its unity with the whole life of God, and despite its dependence in countless ways upon

³²Ibid., p. 284.

³³Ibid., p. 286.

Nature and upon its fellows, for everything except the individuality and uniqueness of its life.³⁴

The human self is an individual person having a unique identity. Man is an expression of the Absolute; yet, man's reality is precisely being the man that he is. Man in being in the Absolute retains and finds himself. Now that an answer has been formulated, the question may be asked in wonder with Royce: "What deeper human mystery is there than the Ego?"³⁵

³⁴Ibid., pp. 286-87.

³⁵Ibid., p. 21.

CHAPTER III

THE REALITY OF THE HUMAN SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the self's place in its world. The world and the individual are correlative terms for Royce. The world is a constitutive of the self, and the self is an essential in the make-up of the actual world. Now, Royce's metaphysics of the person must be seen in more concrete dimensions.

It has been shown that according to the Fourth Conception of Being an entity has being only as a fulfilment of purpose. The integration of the finite embodiments of purpose forms the expression of the Absolute, who wills the finite instances into being by choosing to have certain purposes fulfilled.¹ According to that metaphysics, then, the human person is essentially social. The more a man synthesizes himself with the human community, the more a person he becomes. In thus uniting himself with the expression of the Absolute, the person unites himself to the Absolute; his will becomes one with the Absolute's.²

Royce says that the self has identity in so far as it can be related to the apparent polar structure of reality. The self is,

¹Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 452.

²Ibid., p. 135.

on the one hand, identified in its relation to the Absolute; and, on the other hand, it is identified in its relation to the world, which is other finite selves. "Consequently, even what is most individual about the Self never appears except in the closest connection with what transcends both the meaning and the life of the finite individual."³ Royce does not view these poles as disjunctive, but rather as identical, in a sense peculiar to Royce. The Absolute finds its expression, and so its reality, in finite selves. The human person is such an expression.

Ordinarily, it is commonly agreed, God (or the Absolute) does not directly tell man what he would like him to do and, so, to become. Royce, too, felt that divine revelations were not the natural means for making the choices of daily life. Since man is an expression within an expression, he must be in harmony with the other factors in the expression. To see his role in the expression of the Absolute, man need only to appreciate the world around him. The world and the individual are correlatives, not isolated from one another as some naive realistic philosophies would have them.

Man must fit into the social structure, which is his world, if he is to acquire his identity. Society, for Royce, is not limited to human selves. The whole universe is a society, that is to say, socially related selves which are individual factors in the total expression of the Absolute. The self in the animal kingdom

³Ibid., p. 169.

possibly may be a whole genus, rather than a particular inferior; however, Royce leaves such speculation for lack of evidence.

The primary society for man, obviously enough, is the human society. To acquire his individual goal and identity, each man must find his place with his fellow men. In the naturally harmonious expression of society, men can help one another find their personal fulfilment, as they compositely achieve the purpose of the Absolute, who has willed that humanity be part of his expression, part of his identity.

Royce, then, sees men not as independent entities which can stand divided. He sees them as ontically bound instances of the Absolute, who need one another in order to have their own being. The brotherhood of man is no poetic figure for Royce. It is the essence of mankind. That the world chaos of early twentieth century humanity was fatal to Royce is not surprising.

The solidarity of men is such that the failings of one are felt by all. In fact, the short-comings of one member in the achieving the expression of the Absolute must be compensated for by another.

In the human society, already structured by history, in which the self is placed, the self must search out his role and then play it. Thus, he acquires selfhood, identity.

Since his identity is an expression of the Absolute, the human self at least has the eternal significance of the Absolute. That man is essentially temporal in no way disparages his value

as a person, for he has an intricate part in the expression of the Absolute.

The community to which the self is related is not just the now existing one. The self is in relation to the static community of now, true. But, also, it is in relation to the community of the past and that of the future. All those finite expressions of the Absolute which preceded the self have contributed to the identity of that self. All those expressions to come are in some way depended on this self for their identity.

Royce by no means intended that his philosophy should stand aloof from the world of men. There would be no purpose for an "ivory-tower" philosophy in Royce's system. Without a purpose a thing cannot be real. In his later philosophy, Royce spent much of his efforts in explicitly applying his metaphysics to the world about him. He did that to such an extent that many interpreters have failed to appreciate his underlying metaphysics. "What concerns any man more than his place in the world, and the meaning of the world in which he is to find this place?"⁴

Man first comes to an awareness of his inner meaning through the community in which he finds himself. "Nobody amongst us men comes to self-consciousness, so far as I know, except under the persistent influence of his social fellows."⁵ When he has found a proper place for himself in his community, the man has come to his

⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁵Ibid., p. 261.

first appreciation of himself as a real self. Now that he is awakened to the reality of his being a unique person, the man begins to acquire further identity. He sees himself as a value in himself, although his functioning will always be in the context of the community. He strives to achieve his goal of total identity, his total perfection. At this point, he has come to a direct appreciation of the Absolute's will. When the man wills his identity, he has conformed his will to the Absolute's. That the will of the Absolute is compatible with man ought not to startle one. It is most natural. When man truly wills, his will is the Absolute's specified in him. As the man achieves his ideal goal of perfect identity, so too in that act does the Absolute achieve its selfhood --of course, from the point of view of the Absolute's eternity, he has his full identity already expressed.⁶

The man, by truly living in his world, has bridged the gap in communication between the Absolute and himself. First he must appreciate the world, then himself, and so the Absolute. Man comes to an appreciation of God's (the Absolute's) will not through divine illumination or any efforts in prayer. He comes to it by living as himself, his true self. That he can recognize himself is part of man's conscious nature.

The ideal self of every person is predetermined by the Absolute. As a person participates in the world, which is the expression of the Absolute's will, he fulfils his ideal. The ideal can

⁶Ibid., p. 148.

never be totally fulfilled, for if that were to happen then the continued existence of the person would be without purpose. Without purpose a being cannot exist.

The task of the philosopher is to bring to light that there is more to reality than the "world of description." He must tell his fellow men the good news that their seemingly insignificant, everyday life is of equal significance as the gigantic cosmos, that in himself man has a personal dignity which he eternally gains for himself. "The way of reflection is long. The forest of our common human ignorance is dark and tangled. . . . The philosopher, in the world of thought, is by destiny forever a frontiersman."⁷ The philosopher's role in the world is to lead men from their primitive attitude of selfish independence to the social awareness of their eternal significance. Obviously, then, the philosopher cannot be content to build an abstract system, which can hardly enlighten the exoteric world. The philosopher must apply his metaphysics to the needs of his day. Therein he will find the test for his philosophy. In The World and the Individual, II, Royce is concerned with developing the metaphysics which he will apply in his later philosophy to the concrete. An example of that would be his program for international insurance. He proposed it as a possible way to deter war and to amend transgressions in a manner fitted to

⁷Ibid., pp. 2-3.

rational men.⁸

The rather cold, abstract, metaphysical term "Absolute" is translated in the religious sphere by the term God.⁹ When one, metaphysically speaking, strives to acquire his identity by fulfilling the Absolute's purpose, he is trying to do God's will. The harmony of the individual with the whole is virtue. The appreciation of the internal meaning of another is love. The solidarity of the individuals in One is the bond of charity. The total identity of the person in the Absolute appears in the religious sphere in the form of the total dependence of the creature. The creature is helpless without the sustaining functioning of God. The creature needs God both for his continued existence and for all of his acts. Without God the creature can have no identity, for he could not be.

The true unity of the human community lies in the World of Appreciation. Only by becoming aware of the internal meanings of individuals can a person become aware of his own internal meaning. Only then can he unite himself in any meaningful way to the community. By so doing, he becomes himself. The community is a constitutive of the individual, just as the individuals form the community.

A man can best come to an appreciation of himself in a

⁸Ralph Di Pasquale, O.F.M., The Social Dimensions of the Philosophy of Josiah Royce (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, Facultas Philosophica, Theses ad Lauream 41, 1961), p. 200.

⁹Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 11.

relationship with another man.¹⁰ Through social contact man progressively appreciates internal meanings, reality. In his primitive stage man tends to have the naive attitude that facts are all there is to truth. Only upon becoming reflective does a man outgrow that naivete.

Facts are the invariants which appear in natural phenomena. They are the links by which men are able to communicate. "For only by means of their common relations to the natural phenomena are the men able to give, one to another, definite signals as to what their intentions are, or to define extensive plans of action in socially intelligible terms."¹¹ Savages viewed facts as embodied spirits. Their animistic theory preserved the notion of social relation between the subject and the factual object. Civilized man has alienated facts by categorizing them. His impatience to master facts has rendered them devoid of personal significance. The need for communication has standardized the categories for men. The attitude, which soon follows, is that the whole of reality is intelligible through categories. A man needs only greater precision in classifying to comprehend a fact.

Error in the categorizing of facts becomes evident when the categories cannot be applied to the social situation.¹² The

¹⁰Ibid., p. 170.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 183-84.

¹²Ibid., p. 185.

"Human Experience" is the reservoir for factual truth. The ultimate criterion, then, is not any sense-experience, but rather the social "ought." If a fact ought to fit the human experience, then it is a true fact. The civilized social consciousness is the apt judge for factual knowledge, rather than an individual's arbitrary view. An example of this would be found in the community of a particular science. The men of that science submit, through the media of periodicals, lectures, seminars, their opinion to the already existing body of knowledge.

Because natural phenomena appear as stable and predictable, men think that they know what matter is. They would explain the unusual, mind, in terms of the usual, matter. They regard matter as a lifeless, stable mechanism controlled by rigid laws of behavior. Royce proposes: "Suppose, after all, that this stable appearance were a delusion."¹³

In Josiah Royce's philosophy, as in any idealism, the question of matter must be handled. Ultimately, Royce will say that material things are of the same stuff that mind is. Hegel, too, hints at that: "the other is merely the expression of the inner."¹⁴

Royce maintains that the empirical sciences deal with phenomena only. They never attain the thing-in-itself, although their precision and accuracy in categorizing may lead us to think that

¹³Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁴G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (2d ed.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 301.

they are reaching the ultimate reality of things. Sciences, for Royce, are methods of bookkeeping. Just as the work of an accountant gives a clear picture of some aspects of business, so too do the sciences indicate the world. But the arbitrary system of the accountant certainly does not map on ontological reality; likewise, neither do the scientific systems.

The sciences have estranged matter from mind. On a close inspection of matter it is seen that it is similar to mind in four respects. (1) In matter, as in mind, there are irreversible processes. (2) In the elements of matter, as among minds, there is inter-communication. (3) Matter, as well as mind, forms its behavior in patterns or habits, which eventually give way to new patterns. (4) The processes of both matter and mind are evolutionary.

From the above empirical findings Royce receives three impressions. (1) The contrast between mind and matter has been greatly exaggerated. (2) It is illegitimate to say that there is unconscious nature; at most, it may be said that some beings are incommunicative. (3) Perhaps the so-called material beings are actually conscious beings who are related in time on a larger scope than human beings (e.g., our million years may be a second for them).

In any case, according to the Fourth Conception of Being an unconscious datum--i.e., a material being--cannot be. "The Unconscious we reject, because our Fourth Conception of Being forbids

all recognition of unconscious realities."¹⁵ Echoes of Teilhard's notion of radial energy come to mind:

In the world, nothing could ever burst forth as final across the different thresholds successively traversed by evolution (however critical they be) which has not already existed in an obscure and primordial way. If the organic had not existed on earth from the first moment at which it was possible, it would never have begun later."¹⁶

Royce admits that there are real entities apart from the knowing subject. What gives objects their individuality is not matter, but purpose. Unlike the idealism of Berkeley, Royce maintains that nature is just as real, and real in the same way, as men are real. "Nature for us is real in precisely the sense in which our fellow-men are real."¹⁷ The Absolute, then, does not create common illusions in men's minds so that they can communicate among themselves. The illusions here involved come from men's minds themselves. Men fool themselves into thinking that the World of Description is the whole of reality. Men by categorizing objects into facts void objects of internal meaning.

Obviously, then, if a man grows insofar as he becomes a member of his community, he cannot live solely in the World of Description. Indeed, sciences tend to estrange him from his community and, so, from himself. Only by coming to an appreciation of the

¹⁵Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 241.

¹⁶Pierre Teilhard De Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 71.

¹⁷Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 236.

internal meanings of others and of himself, does a man join his community. By reflective interpretation he laboriously approaches an awareness of reality. Perhaps, at this point, Royce is not too far distant from Aquinas' contemplation.¹⁸

It can now be seen that inter-personal relations had an absolutely necessary place in Royce's philosophy. Man has mutual communication only with other men. In interpretation, that process by which truth is found as the interpreters cut off one another's subjective biases, men come to the World of Appreciation. Therein, they find their own fulfilment.

Thus an interpretation is a relation which not only involves three terms, but brings them into a determinate order. One of the three terms is the interpreter; a second term is the object--the person or the meaning or the text--which is interpreted; the third is the person to whom the interpretation is addressed.¹⁹

Interpretation seeks an object which is essentially spiritual. The abyss of abstract conception says of this object: It is not in me. The heaven of glittering immediacies which perception furnishes answers the quest by saying: It is not in me. Interpretation says: It is nigh thee--even in thine

¹⁸ Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Anton C. Pegis (Basic Writings of Saint Thomas, II; New York: Random House, 1945), Bk. III, chap. XXXVII, pp. 59-60.

Saint Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1956), Bk. II, chap. 83, art. 28, pp. 280-81.

Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. De Rubeis, Billuart, P. Faucher, O.P. (cum textu ex recensione Leonina; Taurini, Italy: Marietti, 1948), pars IIa IIae, q. 180, art. 7, pp. 838-39.

¹⁹ Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, Vol. II, Lectures XI and XII, Classic American Philosophers, ed. Max H. Fisch (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 218.

heart; but shows us, through manifesting the very nature of the object to be sought, what general conditions must be met if any one is to interpret a genuine sign to an understanding mind. And withal, interpretation seeks a city out of sight, the homeland where, perchance, we learn to understand one another. . . . ²⁰

The prime example of an inter-personal relationship is that of the husband-wife. In marriage, Royce says, the partners must come to a true appreciation of each other's internal meaning. Then, they so unite themselves that purposes become one purpose in the Absolute. Their identities, then, are constituted by the marital relationship. This is their love, to find themselves in one another. For one partner to will good to himself, to will more identity for himself by striving to achieve his purpose, his ideal self, necessarily demands that he will good and more identity to his partner. The fulfilment of his purpose is the fulfilling of her purpose. A concrete representation of the marital relationship may be seen in Sigrid Undset's Kristin Lavransdatter, in which the wife Kristin develops in her identity as she fits her life's purpose with her husband's and children's.

As man by appreciation extends himself further from just himself to the whole of reality, he sees that his personal good is the good of the whole. In no way can the two goods be contradictory.

By way of resumé of this chapter, the human person is

²⁰Ibid., pp. 221-22.

constituted by the diarchial principles which are self and world. In the sense that the self is determined by the free will of the Absolute, the self is a totally transcendental principle. But, secondarily, in the sense that the self finds expression only in the world, it is a totally immanent principle. Because of its transcendental character, the person cannot be defined. However, as the self becomes immanent to the world, an appreciation of its inner meaning can be grasped.

The principles of the person function in two planes of reality: the World of Appreciation and the World of Description. The World of Appreciation has two aspects: willing and its consequent fulfilment. The particular act of the will gives the persons only a partial consciousness of the self as it appears at the instant. The total will places the person in the eternal scheme as a self fulfilling a purpose.

The deed, or the fulfilment of will, can be carried out only in the community. In the community of nature, the deed must fit the internal meanings of beings. In the human community, the deed must join the person in a greater participation with his fellow men, who harmoniously express their wills by deeds and, so, embody the Absolute's Will.

The World of Description has two levels. The scientific

²¹To a great extent the philosophy of Luigi Sturzo parallels Royce's on this doctrine of the human person.

Luigi Sturzo, The True Life, trans. Barbara Barclay Carter (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1947), p. 152.

level must be appreciated for what it is, i.e., a bookkeeping system. Men must not entrust all truth to the sciences. The sciences lack any awareness of internal meanings. Their forms are determined by the interest of the scientists, not by any isomorphism with reality. The sciences see man as a determined machine in a cause-effect framework; and, of course, the sciences see only independent men apart from the human community.

The common-sense level is naive. It branches out into dogmatic metaphysics with its stress on the truth of independent empirical facts and into mysticism, which cannot be substantiated.

The human person is constituted by its ideal self and the world. And, so, Royce has entitled his great metaphysical work the World and the Individual.

CHAPTER IV

SOME PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN SELF

Now that the basic structure of the human person has been seen, this chapter will look at some of the person's properties, which make it possible for him to function. The three properties unum, verum, bonum (one, true, good) will be taken as a handy scheme for bringing out the person's unity, reality, and volition, although Royce does not use them. Of course, the transcendentals with Royce do not spring from an existential principle; and, so, they must not be confused with the properties seen in the Scholastic context. Then, finally, under volition the freedom and immortality of the person, which according to Josiah Royce are derived from will, will be considered.

It will be pointed out that in Royce's philosophy the three transcendental properties formally imply one another. These implications are so strong in Royce that he does not make the three properties explicitly distinct, for he in no way bases any distinctions on cognition and, correspondingly, on intrinsic principles of a being. Naturally, then, without such distinctions the three transcendentals will tend to fuse formally into one. Since Royce did not delve deeply into epistemology, he naturally does not define "true" as related to intellect. Therefore, he finds no need

to define, in juxtaposition to "true," "good" as related to will. Furthermore, he can define "one" without reference either to an existential judgment or to sense-experience, because every true being must be one. Universal ideas, he says, are true as individual ideas, but as intentional they are only arbitrary vehicles for action. Since Royce is working in essentialism--that is to say, he does not posit an intrinsic principle of a being for its act of existing--the transcendentials take on the characteristics of functions, i.e., ways of operation, and lose their ontological status as the peculiar characters of existents.

UNUM

Since much has already been said concerning one under the considerations of individuality and identity, it will be only briefly regarded here.

In Royce's context, one may be said to be that characteristic of a self which distinguishes it from all other selves. Each being, or self, for Royce, is one. It has an identity all its own which makes it an individual, while at the same time it finds its identity in relation to the world. The union of the self with the world in no way contradicts the self's personal identity. There is one and only one notion applicable to a self which is derived from appreciation, of course, and not from abstraction. That is its internal meaning. No two selves can have the same internal meanings. If Royce admitted a cyclic theory of history, then selves would no longer be one. But he flatly denies such a view

of history,¹ and each self retains its uniqueness. If through repetition all the formal notes of a self were found in another self there would be absolutely nothing to differentiate them. History is linear. The self has a past, as well as its present, which gives it a unique role to play in the progression of the Absolute's expression, the world.

To be a self, or in other words a being, one must strive by his own choice to achieve his ideal self. To be one, to fulfil one's unique role in the world, one must be free, that is to say, one must be able to acquire the good of his own being. One implies good. To be one is the object of the self's will. It is the good desired.

Our doctrine of individuality demands that every Self shall be in some respect free. Our doctrine of the unity of Being implies that all Selves are known, without any true separation, in the organism of a single world life. And so far from there being any opposition between these two aspects of our idealistic realm, they are strictly reciprocal aspects. The²one World and the free individual imply each the other.

"Individuality is a category of the satisfied Will."³ As such the proper way to come to an appreciation of individuality would be through an activity of the will, viz., love. One best knows another as an individual when he loves him or her. When one

¹Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 437.

²Ibid., p. 393.

³Ibid., p. 432.

loves, he loves this individual and no other. Then, no other can take his or her place for him. "But I can never discover, by my thinking process taken as such, what constitutes their individuality."⁴ Thus it is that for the human mind, with its distinct functions of knowing and willing, individuality will always remain a mystery, lying beyond the confines of definitions. Gabriel Marcel, sometime after Royce's death, will also exalt the individual as a mystery which stands above sociological categories.⁵

VERUM

Although one in Royce's system logically implies good, true will be taken under consideration now for reasons of expediency, since the consideration on the good will be more involved than that on the true. To complete the cycle, good implies true, as true implies one. It will be seen later how this works out.

True, for Royce, means to function as a partial or total expression of the Absolute's total expression. All truth is grounded in will.⁶ The truth of facts is determined by "Ought."⁷ Those facts are real which enable one to fulfil his purpose. Since the expression of the Absolute is composed of harmonized individuals,

⁴Ibid.

⁵Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being (2 vols., Gateway ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960).

⁶A parallel with Royce's notion of truth may be found in Anselm's rectitudo.

Anselm, De Veritate, Vol. I of Opera Omnia, ed. Prior et Abbas Beccensis (Seccovii: 1938), chap. iv, pp. 180-81, chap. vii, p. 189.

⁷Royce, p. 41.

there can be no conflict in true facts. If a fact ought to be, if it is apropos, then it is true.

On the other hand, in the World of Appreciation, the truth of internal meanings is also derived from will. What a self is in its inmost essence is determined by the will of the Absolute. When one tries to appreciate the ultimate reality of a self, he is seeking to know an expression of Will. So it is that a purely intellectual approach can not come to the full truth of reality. For a real appreciation, one must volitionally grasp the other. That is to say, he must love the other as one who is fulfilling a distinct purpose in the Absolute's expression. Such love binds the two in the One; and, so, also draws each into a greater participation of reality.

Abstractions are determined by the interest of the knower.⁸ How a person classifies facts is totally up to his choice. The interests which his world gives him guides his selection of categories. However, it must not be thought that this subjectivism means fickle arbitrariness. On the contrary, the choice which the subject makes for classification should be that most apt in helping him achieve his purpose. The "Ought," then, which flows from the Absolute, insures a kind of standard objectivity for facts by way of the subject, not the object.⁹

⁸Ibid., p. 51.

⁹Ibid., p. 52.

Temporality is bound up in the way that men know reality. The Absolute, on the other hand, since he is in eternity, knows all reality in one eternal grasp. He knows his expression completely, precisely because he is his expression and because he has willed this de facto expression into being.

Moreover, the comprehensive knowledge of the Absolute means that there is absolute truth. Although the Absolute's knowledge is dependent on the free choices of men, the truth of their actions is grounded in an Absolute. Truth is not merely a subjective matter which can be accepted or not, as one wishes. Truth must conform to the Absolute who sees all truth in an eternal now.¹⁰

God knows each individual person. While it is true that God sees man in one insight, he also sees the temporal aspect in man. He knows that man is one who must strive in time toward his ideal self.¹¹

Truth, then, can by no means be limited to the region of the senses. "All truth is the object of acknowledgement, and not merely of immediate experience."¹² Truth lies deeper than the superficial data, the given. It has for its ultimate source the Absolute's will itself. As all things are only insofar as they are expressions of the Absolute, so too they are true only insofar as they

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 140-41.

¹¹Ibid., p. 147.

¹²Ibid., p. 159.

by their purposes satisfy the Absolute's will.

The person is at first ignorant of his true identity and individuality, although that is of prime import for him. He cannot comprehensibly see his role in the world, that is to say, how he will fulfil God's will. But he at least has the assurance of knowing that God knows who he really is. Secondly, the person knows that his truth can be had only in uniting his finite will with God's. The person must retain a certain amount of dissatisfaction, for he cannot see just how it is that he is acquiring his individuality, his reality. But, thirdly, the person does come to some appreciation of himself.

The knowing, however, that my will wins unique expression in my life, and in my life as distinct from all other individual lives, is, ipso facto, my individual and conscious knowing. Hence in God, in the eternal world, and in unity, yet in contrast with all other individual lives, my own Self, whose consciousness is here so flickering, attains an insight into my own reality and uniqueness.¹³

He sees himself as that which with certain improvements fits into his world. That propriety is his reality. In Royce's early novel, The Feud of Oakfield Creek,¹⁴ Harold is a good example of one who finds his truth by functioning properly in his community. The truth of oneself, however, can be fully known only in the eternal world, ". . . in God, we become aware of how our wills are fulfilled through union with him. . . ."¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 434.

¹⁴Josiah Royce, The Feud of Oakfield Creek, A Novel of California Life (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1887).

¹⁵Royce, The World and the Individual, II. 435.

In your eternal union with God you see what even your present life and purposes mean; and they mean, even as they are, infinitely more than your human type of consciousness makes manifest to yourself.¹⁶

BONUM

Good is that which complies with the Absolute's will for it. Every self--i.e., every being--is good in the sense that it fulfils a purpose. Every self is more or less apt and proper in the total structure. Every self is good for the whole and therein finds its own good. Man has a natural tendency to see the propriety of beings and to will that propriety into existence. "For the Ought, as such, is never merely foreign to my own will."¹⁷

The person knows that his own goodness lies within the Absolute. He is good insofar as he identifies his will to the Absolute's. Goodness, then, is grounded in the Absolute. Even though men can see little of lasting worth in their ephemeral roles, nevertheless they have the assurance that their value as persons rests immutable in the Absolute.

--that my meaning, I say, when included in one whole with all these endless differences, is identical with God's will. But taken by myself, as now I am, I am, indeed, remote enough, in my passing consciousness, both from my own self-expression, and from my final conscious union with my Other, namely with the Absolute.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., p. 436.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 370.

Freedom

Royce strongly maintains that the person is free. Man is free to become himself. Positively, freedom is connected with individuality. Precisely because a man is a unique individual he is free.

Therefore are you in action Free and Individual, just because the unity of the divine life, when taken together with the uniqueness of this life, implies in every finite being just such essential originality of meaning as that of which you are conscious.¹⁹

The human self must be free to progress towards its goal or to ignore its goal. De facto, there is sin and a lack of harmony in the human community. That can be attributed only to an evil finite will. There would be a contradiction in saying that the Absolute wills the harmony of all selves in the community and that the same Absolute wills the selves not to be in harmony in the community.

De jure, if the human self was determined to its perfection, there would be no morality. The "ought," which the self is conscious of, would have no significance. Sin and virtue, the coward and the hero, would have no distinction.

Freedom, however, seems to mean for Royce much the same as it did for Kant. Freedom is that condition in which a being is not affected or influenced by external factors in its activity. According to Royce, freedom is that possibility of the self by which

¹⁹Ibid., p. 470.

it can find expression for its internal meaning. No external factor affects the self's expression of its internal meaning.

The problem then of my freedom is simply the problem of my individuality. If I am I and nobody else, and if I am I as an expression of purpose, then I am in so far free just because, as an individual, I express by my existence no will except my own.²⁰

Goodness is closely tied in with freedom. Precisely because the self is free, it can effect good--the primary good effect being its own reality. Tolstoy expressed it thisway: "If goodness has causes, it is not goodness; if it has effects, a reward, it is not goodness either. So goodness is outside the chain of cause and effect."²¹ He means that no external cause by forcing a will can bring about a good effect. The person must freely of himself bring about good.

The human will, then, is free with respect to specification in the sense that no external factor can inhibit or corrupt the course of the man's identity, his internal meaning. But it must now be seen if the human will is internally free, i.e., whether it is autonomous or not.

In a moral act there is both an objective aspect and a subjective one. Objectively, the person is in a world. There a certain propriety is demanded of him by the world itself. He must act in a certain way to satisfy the "ought" which is presented to him.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 330-31.

²¹ Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), p. 925.

The "Ought" is presented in the form: "Harmonize thy will with the world's Will."²² The moral agent is able to appraise the situation in which he must act. If he could not, that he is a moral agent would be meaningless.

And this individual will of the agent must be so expressed in the deeds that in some genuine respect it lies with the agent himself to determine what nothing else in the world determines, namely, the right or wrong character of this deed, and its conformity or non-conformity to the standard which constitutes the Ought.²³

This is not the Kantian "Ought" which is a universal moral form. Royce's "Ought," which is incarnated in the world, in each instance is uniquely significant for the person and for the world.

One place where internal freedom shows up is in an act of sin. For Royce, sin is utter foolishness. It is not so much going against some external mandate. It is rather going against one's very self. The legislation as to what is sin, then, is hardly left to some arbitrary will. Sin is a denial of self under the illusion of self-aggrandizement: "seeks to master the world in the service of the mere caprice of the Self."²⁴

Man intrinsically has freedom of exercise. Man can sin not by becoming what he wishes regardless of the Absolute's will. Man can sin only by not becoming what his ideal self demands of him. "To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of

²²Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 348.

²³Ibid., p. 345.

²⁴Ibid., p. 350.

the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes."²⁵ Man can shrink reality for himself. He can choose not to see the whole truth. He can ignore some of the demands of his world. To be or not to be is the option for man. But he cannot give to himself another internal meaning. He cannot find his identity, his reality according to any purpose. The one which he has, which was ordained by the Absolute, alone contains his identity.

Sin in its intention is not only opposed to the truth of the person, but it is also "world-destroying."²⁶ It undermines the very structure of reality. Consciously to act out of vicious ignorance is diametrically opposed to that goodness which gives the world its being. However, precisely because it is finite, the perversion of a human will does not destroy the world, nor does it even set the world ajar. True, the sinner has failed to fulfil his role in the Absolute's expression. But the sinner is not so important as he may think. God does not need him. He needs God. Although God would like him to function properly--which is clear from the fact that he made the man with his own internal meaning--he is not at a loss when the man goes astray. By the eternal wisdom of the Absolute, the other members of the world must and do compensate for the loss in expression resulting from the sin: ("every evil deed must somewhere and at some time be atoned for,

²⁵ Ibid., p. 359.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 366.

by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself, . . .
 .")²⁷ The sin brings about a whole set of reactions, which over-

come its objective harm in the world-order. "As an evil, it cannot exist in isolation. Its supplement appears in the form of deeds of atonement, reparation, control, condemnation, and in the end, fulfilment."²⁸

In spite of the fact that all men must struggle with evil, must fight to keep themselves open to reality, says Royce, the world as a whole, viewed from the standpoint of eternity is a good.²⁹ The striving to fulfil the "Ought" results in good. That man is able thus to acquire his own identity and that of the world is to his glory.

Physical evil results from some deficiencies in the finite order, not in the Absolute. If things go wrong, it is because some finite will is malfunctioning. Royce says "that all ill fortune results from the defects, or at least from the defective expression, of some finite will."³⁰ Thus, in no way can evil be attributed to God. God is all-good, since as Absolute Will he is the source of good. All finite beings are good only insofar as they are expressions of God's will. Thus it is that evil, by the very meaning of the word, must be severed from God. "This evil is

²⁷Ibid., p. 368.

²⁸Ibid., p. 371.

²⁹Ibid., p. 379.

³⁰Ibid., p. 390.

not in any sense in God, nor yet in the world by any divine consent; but is in a being who, in his freedom, is now wholly independent of God or of any other moral agent."³¹

The world as it now is, that is, as a not yet completed fulfilment of the Absolute's will, is a good. There is no omega point where the world will find its goodness.³² Rather, it is good here and now as partial fulfilment. So too, the person, though not yet fully developed, though not yet a complete expression of his internal meaning, is a good.

Immortality

Any act of a person has the character of the eternal at least in this sense: it is an expression of the eternal will of the Absolute. The act has played a unique role which stands as an integral part of the Absolute's expression for all time.³³

An ethical self need be immortal. Royce says that it would be a contradiction to say that an ethical self has fully accomplished its purpose.

For that is of the very essence of Ethical Selfhood, namely, to press on to new tasks, to demand new opportunity for service, and to accept a new responsibility with every instant.³⁴

If the ethical self were to run out of opportunities, i.e., cease to be able to function as an ethical self, it could not have been

³¹Ibid., p. 399.

³²Ibid., p. 421.

³³Ibid., p. 429.

³⁴Ibid., p. 430.

ethical in the first place. The ethical self must place himself in relation to the whole order of good. Since he never fully achieves his end, he is sustained in temporal existence by that end which is constitutive of his ethical nature. Ethical, i.e., having a free-will, implies immortality.

In three considerations, Royce approaches the question of human immortality. He hopes to show that immortality is a logical implication in his doctrine of being. He does not offer a deductive argument which will be cogent to any mind. Only for those who know Royce's conception of being will his views on immortality be meaningful. Thus, while looking at his considerations, the background of his metaphysics must be kept in mind.

The first approach that Royce takes toward exposing human immortality is founded in God. The human self is an expression, though partial, of God himself, in the manner already described. As such it shares in the immortality of God. To be immersed in another self, as was explained earlier, by no means destroys one's own self. It is quite compatible, according to Royce, for the human self to have its own proper existence in the self of God.

What we so far assert is that, in God, every individual Self, however insignificant its temporal endurance may seem, eternally possesses a form of consciousness that is wholly other than this our present flickering form of mortal consciousness. And now, precisely such an assertion is indeed the beginning of a philosophical conception of Immortality.³⁵

³⁵Ibid., p. 435.

Hoyce would say that such an immortality retains personal identity. In fact, to exist in God consciously the person has an awareness of his true self and not just the partial view of self experienced in time.

We ourselves, and not merely other individuals, become, in God, conscious of what we are, because, in God, we become aware of how our wills are fulfilled through our union with him, and of how his Will wins its satisfaction only by virtue of our unique share in the whole.³⁶

The second approach of Hoyce views death as the mere passing of a more particular self into a greater self. Much as our passing ideas by dying take on significance in the integral person, our temporal lives by terminating take on significance in the integral self of eternity.

For us, to be means to fulfil a purpose. If death is real at all, it is real only in so far as it fulfils a purpose. But now, what purpose can be fulfilled by the ending of a life whose purpose is so far unfulfilled? I answer at once, the purpose that can be fulfilled by the ending of such a life is necessarily a purpose that, in the eternal world, is consciously known and seen as continuous with, yes, as inclusive of, the very purpose³⁷ whose fulfilment the temporal death seems to cut short.

Death, then, is in no sense the annihilation of the person. Rather, it is one more step, by which the person enters into a new phase of his existence.

The possibility of death depends upon the transcending of death through a life that is richer and more conscious than is the life which death cuts short, and the richer life in question is, in meaning, if not in temporal

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid., p. 440.

sequence, continuous with the very life that death interrupts.³⁸

In the comprehensive view of the person, death takes on a positive meaning which is hidden from the view of temporality. Man sees now through a glass darkly. The truth of a mathematical function--e.g., $f(x,y)$ --transcends its meaning at any particular point--e.g., (x_1, y_1) . Indeed, the point has its true identity in terms of the function. The point isolated from the integration is insignificant. The finality of death is not so much that it brings to an end but rather than it opens for greater fulfilment of purpose.

For our theory implies that when I die, my death is possible as a real fact only in so far as, in the eternal world, at some time after death, an individual lives who consciously says: "It was my life that there temporally terminated unfinished, its meaning not embodied in its experience. But I now, in my higher Self-expression, see why and how this was so; and in God I attain, otherwise, my fulfilment and my peace."³⁹

In his third approach to human immortality, Royce views the ethical person as an infinite series of moral acts. The ethical person can never say enough, for that would be to ignore the demands of reality, i.e., to sin. "An ethical task is essentially one of which I can never say, 'My work is finished.'"⁴⁰

As an ethical person, a man must act morally every time that

³⁸Ibid., p. 441.

³⁹Ibid., p. 443.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 444.

he is confronted with a new situation. He must at least love this new world in which he finds himself. But his moral activity itself influences the world in such a way that it becomes other than what it was before his activity. Therefore, he is faced with a new demand, because there is a new world for his moral activity. The ethical person is caught, happily enough for him, according to Royce, in an infinite series of moral acts. For him to come to a terminus would be a contradiction for his ethical nature. The person's obligation to act morally insures his immortality.

From the standpoint of temporality, the ethical person is immortal in the sense that he must ever act anew ethically. He must be represented by an infinite series. Indeed, Royce points out, we never experience an individual who is fully expressed. There is always the possibility for more.

That the individual life of all of us is not something limited in its temporal expression to the life that now we experience, follows from the very fact that here nothing final or individual is found expressed.⁴¹

From the standpoint of eternity, the ethical person is an integral one who stands in his full significance eternally in God. He is an infinite function, which is comprehended under one notion which contains the character of the infinite, the ideal self. As was explained earlier, there can be many partial infinities, finite ethical selves, and only one total Infinite, the Absolute.

In brief, then, Royce in three ways shows that man's union

⁴¹Josiah Royce, The Conception of Immortality (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900), p. 76.

with God implies his immortality: (1) the fact that man has his identity in him, (2) that a particular self can emerge into a larger self without its annihilation, (3) that no ethical self can fully accomplish its purpose.⁴²

As to what the future life may be, Royce does not wish to speculate. He feels that it is outside of the boundaries of philosophy. Man must humbly await the future in store for him, where he is to find his true identity and happiness.

I know not in the least, I pretend not to guess, by what processes this individuality of our human life is further expressed, whether through many tribulations as here, or whether by a more direct road to individual fulfillment and peace. I know only that our various meanings, through whatever vicissitudes of fortune, consciously come to what we individually, and God in whom alone we are individuals, shall together regard as the attainment of our unique place, and of our true relationships both to other individuals and to the all inclusive Individual, God himself. Further into the occult it is not the business of philosophy to go. My nearest friends are already, as we have seen, occult enough for me. I wait until their mortal shall put on--Individuality.⁴³

Mr. Cotton, I think, has not clearly enough distinguished the viewpoints of time from that of eternity in Royce's philosophy. By confusing the two outlooks, he has laid Royce open to his charges that the human person does not retain personal immortality and that Royce's inferences for immortality are invalid.⁴⁴

⁴²Royce, The World and the Individual, II, 445.

⁴³Royce, The Conception of Immortality, p. 80.

⁴⁴James Harry Cotton, Royce, On the Human Self (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 154-55.

Royce's statements will retain their validity if one realizes that in the temporal order the self has not accomplished its goal, its ideal self, and also that in the eternal order the self is fully expressed as part of the Absolute's total expression. Eternity transcends time; but it does not negate it. What is to be worked out temporally cannot be superseded by its actuality in eternity.

The temporal, viewed from eternity, is sublated, but not destroyed or eliminated. The eternal, viewed from time, is real as a significant component in finite functioning. That the eternal, the infinite, the ideal will always be approached but never attained in time does not dissolve the eternal into nothingness. The eternal is constitutive of the finite; and, so, it is just as real. To do justice to Royce's philosophy, we must maintain both points of view.

The human person is one, an individual. He is an individual by reason of his purpose, which flows from the good will of the Absolute. The Absolute, in willing the person into being by giving him a purpose, has given the person his own proper identity, his ultimate reality, his truth. The person, by being true to himself, makes himself the unique individual that God wants him to be.

Man's freedom, identity, and immortality are entwined, for man is free to acknowledge the individuality of others. He is free to enter the world of appreciation where love binds individuals toward their mutual perfection as the expression of the Absolute.

Man is free to acquire his own true identity by living in conformity to the "Ought." Man is free to make himself an individual by uniquely joining the unity of the world. He is free to determine his degree of immortality.

CHAPTER V

A CRITIQUE ON ROYCE'S NOTION OF THE HUMAN SELF AS PRESENTED IN THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL, VOL. II

This is the last phase of this endeavor to present Royce's notion of the human self. A critique of Royce's doctrine of the human self will be given here. It is hoped that the essentials of his doctrine have already been presented in the previous chapters, however inadequately. Throughout this work, a primary concern has been to bring out the metaphysical basis and significance of Royce's doctrine. It is hoped that by now it is somewhat clear that Royce's "self," "community," "purpose," "Absolute," etc. are not mere arbitrary concepts, but that they are meant to indicate the true structure of reality. In this chapter, some of the most often used labels for Royce's philosophy will be considered briefly. Then, a look at the pro's and con's of his system, as pertaining to the human person, will be taken. Finally, a word will be mentioned about the significance of Royce for the world.

One of the dangerous pitfalls for historians of philosophy is to categorize a philosopher with a ready-made label. The reason, obviously, is that the description of a philosopher demands tailored wording, for if he is a philosopher of any consequence his

thought is a unique contribution to the progress of ideas. Four names are often given to Royce's philosophy: idealism, pantheism, voluntarism, Hegelianism. Now a consideration of those ready-made labels and an attempt to point out their inadequacies will be presented.

IDEALISM

Idealism appears in two distinct, though parallel, avenues of philosophy. It can appear in epistemology or in metaphysics.

Royce, in The World and the Individual and previous works, has done little toward working out a detailed epistemology, although in later works he did set the general framework for his epistemology. Pierce assisted Royce in developing his epistemology by providing him with the idea of interpretation in its triadic structure. But, even that could hardly be called a detailed epistemology. Perhaps, the lack of a well thought out theory of cognition is the greatest deficiency in Royce's philosophy.

If Royce is denominated an idealist, the term must be taken in the metaphysical sense. Idealism, taken metaphysically, is the view that all reality is of the same stuff as spirit. In such a view, matter loses its primary role as a basic principle and is reduced to a certain kind of spiritual determination. Royce's metaphysical idealism, it should be pointed out, is in the framework of the Absolute--finite polarity, which was considered in chapter I.

If one were to ask Royce whether he were an idealist or not,

he would unabashedly answer that he was. But what does idealism mean? If it means just a denial of matter, then surely Royce would fit under this heading. But if by idealism one means the denial of all objective reality, i.e., all reality other than the subject, Royce would not be an idealist. Certainly Royce admits the reality of other finite selves and also the Absolute. Perhaps, then, one could call him an objective idealist.

One may further ask: is there any significant difference between an objective idealist and a realist? Each admits the truth of other beings. Indeed, it seems that the role the realist gives to matter is actually satisfied in the idealist's philosophy by some sort of functionary form. Also, the realist himself will admit that he cannot strictly define matter, because any definite determination does not pertain to matter qua matter, that is to say, it cannot reveal the full meaning of prime matter. Voltaire, in a moment of mockery, threw that very thing in the face of philosophers. "The philosophers all spoke at the same time as before, but they were all of different opinions."¹ Again, he writes: "Then you don't know what matter is."²

Nevertheless, upon investigation, it must be said that there is a very deep significance which severs the two schools of philosophy. The realist holds that matter is a true, intrinsic principle of a material being, that it is the potency which can receive forms

¹Voltaire, "Micromegas," ed. Wallace Fowlie (French Stories; New York: Bantam, 1960), p. 38.

²Ibid., p. 40.

and which limits the being by restricting the kind of its form and so, too, the being's act of existence. Of course, that presentation is backwards in that the being is first had, then its principles are found through analysis. Some realists (Thomists) would say that the principle of individuation for a material being is ultimately matter.

The realism which Royce more directly opposes is empirical realism rather than Thomism. Royce reacts against the position that the real is the empirical and that all other knowledge is in the order of mental constructs. The real for Royce is not divorced from mind. The real is mind under the appearance of purpose.

The idealist denies any indeterminate principle for a being. He must, therefore, look elsewhere for his principle of individuation. His principle will be formal; and, so, the individual is seen as such because of his place in a system. How the individual is to function in a formal system is precisely what makes him an individual. Royce's principle of individuation is purpose, which assumes its character in terms of the whole system of the Absolute.

When the idealist views the individual as functioning in a particular place and at a particular time, he has not bridged the gap between himself and the realist who says that the material being is composed of primary matter and substantial form. However, he has brought the two schools of thought a bit closer together. That, at least, Royce has done. His idealism speaks in straightforward words without any mystical obscurity. He tried to explain

the world as he found it. He tried to pierce the surface of experience to elements more fundamental to the human way of life: love, loyalty, self, God. His honest attempt at disclosing the truth of reality can hardly be ignored, even by those in the realist's camp.

Although Royce primarily directed his charges against the realism of Positivism and Critical Realism, he also had in mind Scholasticism. Because of that, for one reason, his criticism may be thought in terms of Scholastic Realism. Also, Royce's idealism is more vividly delineated against the background of Scholastic Realism.

PANTHEISM

Often the charge is laid against Royce that he is a pantheist. It would be good now to go into a brief consideration of this second label, which, it will be eventually concluded, is misleading. By way of definition, pantheism is the belief that the universe taken as a whole is God. Admittedly, Royce does leave himself open to the charge of pantheism. It has been seen that the distinction between finite beings and God in Royce's philosophy is a highly refined notion and is not easily grasped on first acquaintance. Since Royce calls the universe the expression of God or of the Absolute, God, for him, takes on identity in the particular determinations of the finite beings. In that sense, God is identified with his finite expressions. However, for Royce the individual finite being retains its own personal reality while at the same time it

finds the meaning of that reality only in terms of the Absolute, God.

Royce thinks that the form of the expression is determined by the free choice of God, which is made in eternity, i.e., transcendently to the temporality of the expression itself. God's will transcends the finite world; and, so, God is not determined by a finite being. Thus, it seems that Royce draws an extremely fine distinction between the Absolute and its expression. Only in Royce's sense--as was pointed out in a previous chapter--can the expression be said to be identified with the Absolute.

It seems that to label Royce a pantheist is misleading although in some sense it may stand. Also, such terms as monist and panpsychist should be applied only with reservations.

Once again let it be pointed out that there are two viewpoints which must be taken to have a full appreciation of Royce's philosophy. The viewpoints of the finite self and of the Absolute serve as a dialectic in Royce's philosophy in such a way that each complements the bias of the other. Certainly, from the viewpoint of the finite self, Royce's philosophy is not a pantheism. The reality of the person never dissolves, for Royce, into that of the Absolute. The human person, because he consciously directs himself toward his own personal end, by nature retains his personal identity. His internal meaning, although it serves the purpose of the Absolute, is the man's own identity as an individual.

On the other hand, however, from the viewpoint of the

Absolute, the meaningfulness of the self is that it is an expression of the Absolute. The identity of the finite self has significant reality only in the Identity of the Absolute. It would be too simple to say that the finite being is the Absolute. It may be said that it functions as part of the Absolute. In that sense, Royce does verge on pantheism. Again, that is but one aspect of two. When Royce's philosophy is seen from both viewpoints, the term pantheism does not seem to give a true indication of his philosophy.

Royce has presented his conception of the relation of God and finite selves in his explanation of the structure of the Absolute. There he pointed out that God, whose form is expressed by the whole of reality, is a real Self and men, by reason of their conscious striving to fulfil their unique purposes, are real selves within the Self. Hence, to present Royce with a question on creation would be the same as asking Royce to leave the context of his own philosophy in order to think with concepts of another philosophical context. Royce does not speak of the creation of the self by the Absolute in cause-effect terms, for he conceives of causation much as Kant did before him. Creation is a concept which arises in the context of causation. For Royce, the origin of finite being is not conceived of in terms of creation, except by analogy. As an idea is created by the mind of man to express the man's meaning, in much the same manner man is created by the Absolute to express His meaning.

It is important to note here, in passing, that there are different levels in thinking. At times, it can happen that two statements in their derivative form are quite different, although in their prime meaning they are actually the same. Paul Tillich points out that, when the cause category is superseded by a more fundamental conception of creation, that which is at the prime level can be understood only symbolically at the derivative level.

And if this is done and is understood, the difference between substance and causality disappears, for if God is the cause of the entire series of causes and effects, he is the substance underlying the whole process of becoming. But this "underlying" does not have the character of a substance which underlies its accidents and which is completely expressed by them. It is an underlying in which substance and accidents preserve their freedom. In other words, it is substance not as a category but as a symbol. And, if taken symbolically, there is no difference between prima causa and ultima substantia. Both mean, what can be called in a more directly symbolic term, "the creative and abysmal ground of being." In this term both naturalistic pantheism, based on the category of substance, and rationalistic theism, based on the category of causality, are overcome.³

Perhaps, then, in view of Tillich's statement, pantheism should be applied only symbolically to Royce's philosophy. Tillich's view is mentioned in order to point out the possibility of a more basic level than the pantheism/theism dichotomy so as to ward off a hasty use of labels, which are often so general, and, thus, so vague that they become insignificant and deceptive out of context. The author of this paper, however, prescinds from the

³Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 238.

question of whether Tillich is right or not, for his aim is to stir one to reflection before an application of pantheism is made to Royce's system.

VOLUNTARISM

Voluntarism is the theory that will is the dominant factor in experience or in the constitution of the world. Because Royce did lay great stress on the role of will as the ultimate source of reality, his philosophy may be said to be a kind of voluntarism. However, one ought to specify the place will has in Royce's system. Will is the ultimate principle of reality for each individual, including the Absolute himself, precisely because each individual is in being because of an act of will. In the case of a finite being, the Absolute, by willing the actuality of a particular expression, brings into being that individual whose identity is found in his purpose for being, i.e., to achieve the ideal self willed to him as his own by the Absolute. In the case of the Absolute, he wills his own existence necessarily. Since he is his ideal self as he eternally exists, the Absolute wills to maintain, not to create anew, his perfection. Certainly his willing of himself is of his very nature, but it is also identical with him. According to Royce's conception of being, a thing exists if it has a purpose. The purpose of the Absolute is to be himself; that is his being. The purpose of the Absolute's will is to maintain the Absolute's existence or that the Absolute may be himself. Since, then, the

purposes of the Absolute and of his will are identical, the Absolute is identical with his will.

Will, however, was never left to blind haphazardness in Royce's philosophy. Will was always guided by the intention of the Absolute. The Absolute in eternity willed his own expression according to his intention. Finite selves willed themselves into greater participations of reality by appreciating the Absolute's purpose as it became apparent in the world. No doubt, will is the ultimate principle of reality for Royce. Since, then, the operation of the will in the case of the Absolute and of finite beings is guided by an intelligent view toward some end, volition supposes intellection. In affirming the priority of will in his philosophy, Royce neither negates nor disparages intellect, whose operation though distinct from will's harmonizes with will in appreciation. Royce would say with Thomas à Kempis: "I would rather feel compunction than know its definition."⁴ Yet, as his life of philosophy bears witness, he would also try intellectually to appreciate compunction.

The ultimate Will is identical with a subsistent person, the Absolute, who consciously directs the form of finite being. When all the nuances found in the whole context have been made somewhat explicit, will may be said to be the ultimate principle for Royce.

⁴Thomas à Kempis, My Imitation of Christ (Brooklyn: Confraternity of the Precious Blood, 1954), p. 5, BK. I, chap. i, sec. 3.

HEGELIANISM

Royce, it can be said without doubt, was greatly influenced by the Hegelian system, which he studied, as well as those of Kant and Fichte. However, if it is often misleading to label a philosopher with a type title, it is even more misleading to label one philosopher with the name of another. Yet, in some sense, Royce may be called an Hegelian, provided that that sense is clearly indicated. It is preferable, however, not to label Royce an Hegelian. The major influence in Royce's thought certainly was not Hegel. Peirce and James are much more significant. Indeed, Royce's early religious environment probably contributed more to his philosophy than did Hegel. The differences found in the two systems Royce and Hegel into different camps.

Now it would be good to look at some of the points of difference in the two men's philosophies and then some points of similarity. Hegel places the ultimate principle of reality in the universal. He calls this universal "Spirit." It is a concrete universal, that is to say, Spirit though universal exists only in individuals. Spirit gives to the individual reality. That fact becomes conscious to Spirit itself (for man is an instance of Spirit) in the process of universalization by which the individual is negated, or rather sublated. Royce, on the other hand, maintains that the ultimate principle in reality is the individual. To be real means to be an individual, to have a unique purpose. Indeed, for Royce, he is most real who is most individual, albeit that the

determinations of individuality take their shape from the communal context of the individual. The Absolute, who is his own context, is an individual. He finds his realization, certainly not in the negation of finite individuals, but in their perfection. For Royce, the individual is a good. For Hegel, the individual person is a perversion of the universal.⁵ Although, admittedly, in essentialism good and bad are meaningful only as polar opposites, it stands clear from the contexts that Royce accepts the individual and Hegel rejects the individual.

With that basic orientation toward the individual, Royce wanted his system to embrace the whole of reality not by exclusion, but by inclusion. He wanted to avoid any reductionism, which, he felt, would narrow his view. He wanted to exclude none of the facets of living: love, science, emotions, abstractions, virtues, truths, sins, errors. He felt that Hegel wrongly reduced the multifarious discourses of reality to one:

His [Hegel's] great philosophical and systematic error lay, not in introducing logic into passion, but in conceiving the logic of passion as the only logic; so that you in vain endeavor to get satisfaction from Hegel's treatment of outer nature, of science, of mathematics, or of any coldly theoretical topic. About all these things he is immensely suggestive, but never final. His system, as system, has crumbled, but his vital comprehension of our life remains forever.⁶

Notwithstanding what has been said, it must be admitted that

⁵Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 504.

⁶Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1892), pp. 226-27.

Hegel's philosophy did influence Royce's thought. There are certain definite similarities in doctrines. Both men were idealists (in a sense already specified) with the religious background of protestantism (although of different denominations) and the philosophical background of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Certainly Royce was in contact with Hegel. In his many essays and lectures on Hegel,⁷ Royce has given good indication that he was well acquainted with Hegel, even to the knowledge of the man's personality.⁸ One who has read Hegel so thoroughly could hardly help but be influenced by his thought. If in no other form, he would at least find himself reacting to Hegel. So, it can be safely said that Hegel played a definite role in the maturing of Royce as a philosopher.

The doctrine which most readily comes to mind as the greatest point of similarity between the two men is that of the Absolute. By the notion of the Absolute, both men hoped to come to a comprehensive view and explanation of reality. That doctrine is the core idea for both men, from which spring all subsequent ramifications. Because of that, it may be said that both were monists in the sense that they sought to explain the whole of reality in terms of one principle. They each denied matter--that is, a principle of indeterminacy foreign to spirit.

⁷ Ibid.

Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).

⁸ Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 196 et seq.

Although their ultimate principles were substantially different, for one absolute universality, for the other absolute individuality, their philosophies took on a similar structure. Truth for them was to be found only in the whole. The fact isolated from the whole expression dissolves into insignificance and, so, unreality. The whole for Hegel was an absolute, unipolar intelligibility, Spirit. Reality, for him, could have only one form. All of reality's meaning was to be derived from one universal idea, Spirit. The whole for Royce, on the other hand, was an arbitrary absolute, determined by the free choice of the individual Absolute. Since the real is determined by the individual, reality could have been molded in all the infinite ways that the infinite number of possibles allowed. From the infinite possibles, one reality was chosen.

Neither Hegel nor Royce allows for a transcendent. God, for Hegel, is merely the universal reality of individuals (this author interprets Hegel's "Spirit" as his God). God is intelligibility only in its concretion in individuals. In somewhat the same way, Royce's God expresses his own being in terms of finite beings. With his immanent determinations in the world, he also functions as a whole; that identifies him as an individual God.

The relation between Royce and Hegel will not be pursued further, although more thoughts along those lines would be fruitful for an understanding of each man's philosophy. The influences of Hegel on Royce and the difference of the two would require the treatment of a book.

Now that this first part concerning the common labels for Royce's philosophy has been concluded, the second part which deals with his favorable points, will be taken.

PRO

Some aspects of Royce's philosophy impressed this author as being both original and significant. First, Royce places great stress on the individual. Individuality is the form of reality. Only by being an individual can a being be real. Royce is somewhat at odds with Hegel on this point. Nevertheless, Royce incorporates within his notion of individuality the idea of universality. The individual, because he is constituted by his community, contains a universal character. Only in his world can man have any reality and significance. As Heidegger would say, Dasein finds itself thrown into being, structured in a world, and presented with possibilities in terms of that world.⁹ Whether one is willing to agree with Royce that the world is itself the expression of Self, at least it must be said that Royce has brought to light that man is ontologically social. Whereas other philosophers have mentioned that man is by nature social, few have gone as far as Royce in forming their philosophy of being around that point. According to Royce, the meaning of man's being evaporates when it is presented abstractly, for abstractions form mental constructs, the tools of

⁹Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

the sciences. Man lives embodied in a world. Any true representation of man must be delineated in his social structure.

The human self in Royce's philosophy is always a unique individual. Each man in his uniqueness takes on the import of reality's total expression, for no other self can take his essential part in reality. True, the self finds its meaning in its role, but it is not reduced to a functionary. Man rises above his job in the world expression precisely because he is a self, a conscious being who appreciates himself and others for what they are. A conscious person cannot be translated by "cog." Man in himself has a dignity which defies all mechanistic interpretations of him, albeit that he uncovers his dignity in his functioning. Man freely chooses to be. Insofar as he acquires his individual identity, he has given to himself a dignity not to be swallowed by his external relations.

The human person is given the possibility and direction for his growth in being when the Absolute thrusts him into existence with an ideal self for his goal. However, the human person must by the strength of his own free will achieve and progress toward his goal. He can bring about his own betterment by acting in accord with his purpose in life. To act morally and to bring about his personal growth, then, he must appreciate his own internal meaning and those of others.

Heidegger quotes Parmenides: "Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι (for thinking and being are the same)."¹⁰ Royce says much

¹⁰Ibid., p. 215.

the same. To be oneself one must know the truth of one's own being and that of others. With such awareness man so acts as to bring into reality his further development as that person which God intends him to be.

The human self is loved by God. Not only does God love a man because he fulfills a certain purpose in His total expression, but also because God has a true concern that this man does develop himself. God knows fully man's internal meaning. He sets up a world in which this meaning is significant, a world where the man can flourish in his full identity. He in no way takes away the man's freedom. Such a God truly loves man. And further, man is an expression of God. As God loves himself, so too does He love each man. As an object of the divine love, man takes on another dimension in import.

Royce sets forth his definition of sin in the framework indicated above. Sin is a deliberate turning from the truth of oneself and of others and acting in that ignorance. Basically, then, sin is a denial of being to oneself and others and, so, to the Absolute, God Himself. Being is that which fulfills purpose. Sin denies purpose or internal meaning. Sin, therefore, denies being.

The ugliness of sin, then, is to be found in itself and not so much in some transgression against an external law. Man by sinning destroys himself and narrows his contact with the world, the correlative factor to his real significance. In sin man finds his delectation and annihilation. In God man finds his happiness and self-identity.

Another point to Royce's credit is that in his philosophy love plays a leading role. Love is the adhesive of the community. Man is bound to the world of selves insofar as he appreciates internal meanings and comports himself in accord with that reality of others. In such a world of appreciation, man finds himself. As he wishes to himself his own good, so must he wish to the world its good. As he loves himself, so must he love the world.

In vain, then, does man seek full cognition through abstraction. An essential ingredient to true knowledge, i.e., "appreciation," is love. Love means to wish goodness or existence to someone. Only when a person enters into such a relation with another or even himself, can it be said that he truly appreciates that person as a self, one who has an internal meaning, a divine destiny to fulfil.

Science, in Royce's system, takes a back seat to a knowledge which is accessible to ordinary men. Royce would emphatically deny that the scientists, and even the professional philosophers, are the only persons who live a truly human life and that the rest of men are second-class citizens in the world. Every man can and should love himself and his neighbor.

Royce's philosophy contains many answers to the problems of his day, as well as the present. There was then in America little social awareness. It was the age of individualism and unrestricted private enterprise. Science, boastful in its fresh starts and early successes, assumed a dictatorship over men's minds, which

many in their ignorance humbly accepted. The very rich wanted to stay that way, by keeping the very poor very poor. The strong were crowding out the weak from any rightful place in the world. In the face of such a world, Royce thrust forth his philosophy which gave to each man an identity which could be found only in his social structure. Most left Royce to his academic circles and continued in their mundane affairs as they had always done. A few saw that Royce's philosophy does contain a true significance for the world. The United Nations, the growing appreciation of the purposelessness of war in view of nuclear weapons, the debt of progressive countries to underdeveloped countries, the increasing harmony between trade unions and management and capital, all these Royce would regard as concrete instances of his philosophical maxims. All of those, although they be in the social dimension, bear the utmost significance for the individual of today.

CON

Royce's philosophy certainly has its faults. Throughout this paper, however, the attempt has been not to belabor the work by harping on the failings of Royce. Such a negative attitude, I think, would surely do injustice to Royce in view of the worthwhile aspects to be found in his philosophy. However, some of Royce's failings will now be indicated.

The first and foremost weakness, in the opinion of this author, is that Royce mentioned no existential principle intrinsic to a being. He has nothing comparable to the Thomistic notion of

esse. A being for Royce is totally comprehensible in formal terms. In other words, a being is fully known by understanding, and there is no need in human cognition for an act of judgment to posit the being in existence. If a purpose is seen for a being, then the being is real. It has already been seen that for Royce formal notes explain individuality, whereas Thomism would say, in the case of material being, primary matter is the principle of individuation. Experience, which is that cognitive activity prior to understanding, is the proper cognitional level for individuation in the case of human knowledge.

True, Royce does say that the Absolute out of an infinite number of possible worlds wills one into being as his chosen self-expression. However, Royce fails to bring clear what it is that differentiates an actual from a possible. The specific instances of the total expression, viz. finite selves, are given their reality in that they formally participate in the total expression. In willing the whole, God creates the particular.

Thus, although it can be said that the three transcendental properties: unum, verum, bonum are proper to each individual, they are meaningful only in terms of operations within the whole. Because of that, the individual's value and dignity as a person, in Royce's philosophy, tends to fall outside the person himself. The common interest dictates the personal, although, it must be said, in Royce's philosophy it is just as true to say that the organized interests of individuals shape the common interest. It is

a question of priority. It seems, however, that one must interpret Royce as saying that the community comes first, then, consequently, comes the individual. Many would find no fault with such a doctrine. Nevertheless, this author cannot accept Royce's priority, since he regards the individual as the source of identity, reality, and goodness from which the community takes on substance. He bases his opinion ultimately on the intrinsic principle esse, from which the transcendentals are derived.

Since Royce rejects matter, he can draw no rigid distinction between human persons and things or animals. However, if one thinks that he does get to the natures of things and animals through their proper accidents as they appear both to scientific and ordinary observation, then he must say that not every being is a conscious self in the full sense that man is. But if one agrees with Royce that his knowledge does not get to a principle of operation, a nature, then he must confess that because of his inadequate knowledge things may to a more perceptive observer be conscious after all. This author does not agree with Royce here.

Royce's system is an endeavor to explain totally in rational terms the whole of reality. Thus, all truth and all being must be immanent to his explanation. His principle of individuation cannot be non-intelligible, as matter is. So, also, since God must not be transcendent to the explanation of the system, the ground for truth and being must be immanent to the system. In principle, God must be comprehensible in terms of the system, and the rational

system itself must satisfy all needs for an absolute. The system is the ultimate, by which everything must be defined and explained.

However, God, as pure Act, is transcendent to the finite order. He can never be fully determined by a human system, for man's knowledge of Him is by nature limited to analogy. God is, however, the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of creatures. He can be so regarded because He it is who endows creatures with their own proper act of existence (esse). Their finitude gives God a transcendent status which can be approached from the human standpoint through analogy. Insofar as a being finitely participates by his determined act of existence in the Infinite Act of Existence, God is immanent to creation. Nevertheless, in no sense is God the material or intrinsic formal cause of creatures. That is to say, God is not the creature and the creature is not God. Thus, He maintains a strict ontological transcendence, while yet being involved in creation.

Also, Royce holds that all final causality is immanent to the world. Practically speaking, such finality does not work. According to Royce, man finds in the world the full opportunity for fulfilling his purpose, although an infinite time is required. The driving force behind the self-expressing is the growth in person. The norm and impetus for activity, then, is the activity itself. Although there is something of truth in that, the doctrine is insufficient. A transcendent with normative and motivating value is needed to give meaning to human life. Otherwise, man would be condemned to wander aimlessly. Each moral choice would be made in view

of the linear progression of self-development, instead of in terms of a subordination of choices in a fundamental commitment to a transcendent. Ultimately, he would have nowhere to go, and he would be in little hurry to get there. In the concrete moral situation, when man is faced with the option to do this particular good in spite of personal discomfort or to take the effortless path downhill, Royce's doctrine of an infinite series of moral acts carries little appeal for the cause of righteousness. His reconciliation in terms of eternity is unintelligible and elusive to the man who must live morally in time.

God is man's ultimate final cause. He it is that gives meaning to temporal cares and ends. Union in Him gives meaning to the striving after good in this life. Only a transcendent God can ground the significance of things immanent to this world. A transcendent God, who raises man to his full perfection and happiness by union with him, alone can make this temporally finite life worthwhile.

Royce has failed to bridge the gap between the temporal and the eternal. Nevertheless, if his philosophy is to be meaningful, the temporal and eternal order, though distinct, must not remain isolated from one another. Hegel, also, saw that there is a basic inadequacy in a morality which is set in a framework where the eternal is sundered from the temporal.¹¹ Royce's humanism maintains that the individual's willing of his perfection in time is

¹¹Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 620.

identical with the Absolute's will in eternity. However, since the ultimate motive for moral activity is self-development and, so, happiness, the transcendent will of the Absolute is in no way operative in human morality. The Absolute, since he has set up the ideal self for each individual, may be said to be an exemplary cause for moral activity, but not a final. The final cause is man's perfection and happiness, which are immanent in the finite world and only coincidental to the Absolute.

One obvious area in Royce's philosophy which may fall under censure is his handling of realism. He hardly puts realism's best foot forward in his contrived dialogue. Royce makes no mention of the doctrine of intentionality as a possible answer of realistic epistemology to his problem of the total separation of subject from object. Yet, the rejection of realism in favor of idealism is at the heart of Royce's philosophy and significant to all the particulars of his philosophizing.

Royce himself does not propose a clear epistemology, especially in his The World and the Individual, II, in spite of the fact that how one knows is a very important aspect of the human person. Also, he fails to indicate how, according to his idealism, communication comes about among men, although this is most indicative of man's social nature.

Those faults which have been found in Royce's philosophy are not, it seems, merely a lack in the sense of not matching Thomistic realism. Rather, they are faults because of insufficiency internal

to his system or because an ontological need for explanation was ignored.

ROYCE'S PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE TODAY

As Royce experienced the brutal assassination of President Lincoln (Royce was ten at the time), so too the people of this age have witnessed the cruel murder of President Kennedy. In a matter of minutes the announcement of President Kennedy's death was sent throughout the nation and, then, throughout the world by teletype and radio. Soon after, the eyes of millions saw the dreadful scene by means of television. Figuratively speaking, the arteries of communications have made the world a unified organism. At that time, the whole world emerged as one in its sympathies for the President's family and his country. Grief and indignation shocked the world into a self-awareness which transcended the everyday, narrow interests of each country. The strong spirits of nationalism are now dissolving, it seems, as the human race appreciates its commonness of purpose. President Kennedy's assassination was noticed by all because of the magnitude of the disruption involved; all considered it a most heinous crime. It disturbed the world-order violently; and, so, it was regarded by all as an evil. So, too, all evil disrupts the God-given order of the world and, more precisely, acts against the natures of individuals or, in Royce's terms, against the internal meanings of selves.

The common manifestation of the sympathies expressed at President Kennedy's death from all quarters of the world, the official

organizations for world government, the International Court of Justice, the growing appreciation among people throughout the world for the universal characteristics of their fellow human beings, all of this and more point to the fact that people are beginning to appreciate their unity in the world. Royce would have said that this is a major step toward self-development.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis was to present Royce's notion of the individual human self, as he sets it forth in the second volume of The World and the Individual.

The human self acquires its immortal and unique identity through its free self-development in conjunction with the Absolute's will. Two diarchial principles, the ideal self which appears in eternity and the world which appears in time, converge in the human self to give him the possibility and direction of his existence and growth. Ultimately, since the world itself is an expression of the Absolute, the two principles are reducible to one, the Absolute's will.

A prime object of attention has been to indicate the metaphysical context for Royce's statements on the human person. Royce does not mean to set up the constitution of the human person in a purely psychological or logical framework. He wishes that his statements be understood in terms of a full and ultimate explanation of reality.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by **Thomas Joseph Grady, S.J.,**

has been read and approved by three members of the Department of
Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact
that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content,
form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

August 17, 1964
Date

Robert F. Hawronch, S.J.
Signature of Adviser